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Abstract 
Actions can be represented at multiple levels.  One can view an act as an isolated task or 
as part of a larger goal.  The specific level at which one represents an action has the 
potential to influence how that action is performed.  The current study explored the 
potential for hierarchical representations to also influence action selection within 
multitasking environments.  The current study used the voluntary task switching 
paradigm to assess whether or not and under what conditions hierarchical task 
representations can be found within the free choice multitasking environments.  In 
Experiment 1 participants switched between four individual task elements.  Three 
manipulations of increasing complexity were used to encourage participants to represent 
these task elements hierarchically.  While manipulations that took place only during the 
practice phase of the experiment were ineffective at establishing a hierarchical task 
representation, manipulations that persisted throughout the experiment influenced task 
selection. The results suggest that hierarchical representations had been formed.  
Experiment 2 explored the stability of hierarchical representations.  The results suggest 
that, once established, the influences of hierarchical representations tend to persist, 
regardless of whether or not they are strictly required.  A final experiment assessed the 
manner in which hierarchical representations are activated.  A null result suggested that 
under the current experimental conditions all of the task elements that make up a 
hierarchical representation were not activated in unison.  The current findings suggest 
that when actions are represented hierarchically, task elements that are part of the same 
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aggregate task as the task performed on the previous trial will be prioritized for selection.  
This prioritization increases the probability that tasks that are part of the same 
hierarchical representation will be performed in succession and can speed the task 
selection process.  As a result, hierarchical representations are likely to influence both 
task choice and performance speed, but influences on measures of task choice are likely 
to occur sooner than influences on performance.  I propose that the more immediate 
influence of hierarchical representations on task choice reflects the functional role that 
hierarchical representations play in the action selection. 
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The Effect of Hierarchical Task Representations on Action Selection in Voluntary Task 
Switching 
 Humans have the perception of volitional control.  If while reading this sentence 
you choose to flip ahead and start reading the last page or turn back and reread the first 
sentence, you presumably do so because of internally formed goals.  You are volitional, 
selecting actions according to your own intentions.  Nevertheless, actions can seem less 
than intentional.  When tired or distracted, one may perform unintentional acts, such as 
putting a carton of milk away in the cupboard instead of the refrigerator.  Interestingly, 
these errors are not failures to perform an action correctly; the milk has not been spilt.  
Instead the failure seems to be in selecting the appropriate task to perform (Monsell, 
1996).  At times the events in one’s environment appear to guide action selection.  
Extreme cases of stimulus-driven action can be seen in patients with frontal lobe damage 
(Lhermitte, 1986); however, stimulus-driven action errors can be seen in healthy 
populations as well (Monsell, 1996).  Further, the absence of an error does not 
necessarily imply the presence of volition.  When multiple actions are acceptable, the 
specific action one selects can be affected by internal processes or environmental factors 
that one is not even aware of (see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999 for review).  Yet despite 
these potentially strong influences, action selection remains for the most part, an 
intuitively autonomous process, such that one typically has the perception that her actions 
are under her control.  How are people able to select actions and accomplish goals in the 
face of these potential biases?  It seems likely that cognitive mechanisms, which help to 
direct choice, exist.  The current study will begin to address the broad question of action 
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selection by assessing one such potential mechanism, hierarchical representations.  A 
hierarchical representation is a mental representation that is made up of components and 
nested subcomponents, where the structure of the superordinate components exert an 
influence on actions represented at the subcomponent level (Schneider & Logan, 2006).  
To understand how this type of mental representation may influence actions it is first 
necessary to understand how basic, non-hierarchical mental representations guide 
performance.  I will thus begin with an overview of mental representations and how they 
become selected and activated so as to enable task execution.  I will then review the 
literature on hierarchical representations and the effects these representations have 
previously been found to have on performance.  Finally, I will discuss the potential for 
hierarchical representations to be adopted when performing volitionally selected actions 
and the influence hierarchical representation may exert on action selection. 
 Performing a single action involves multiple steps.  Often, perceptual processes 
are needed to locate and identify the relevant stimulus.  Additionally, motor processes 
will be needed to generate the relevant movements.  Perceptual and motor processes have 
been highly studied in their own right.  However, a large number of processes are often 
needed to connect the output of perceptual processes to the generation of specific relevant 
motor processes.  Consider a mundane action such as stopping a car at a red light.  Even 
after the perceptual system has identified the stoplight, attention will need to be oriented 
to the relevant aspect of the stimulus (i.e. concentrate on the light’s color rather than its 
shape or luminance).  The relevant stimulus-category classification will be needed in 
order to abstract the meaning of this otherwise arbitrary symbol (i.e. red means stop).  
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The relevant category-response rule will also be needed (i.e. to stop press the brake pedal 
with the right foot), all before motor processes can generate the required response 
movements.  The role of choosing, enabling and coordinating performance has been 
assigned to executive processes (Logan, 1985).  Executive control has been criticized as 
little more than a homunculus (Altmann, 2003), a term that simply serves as a stand in for 
processes of cognition that manage subordinate mental components (Baddeley, 1996).  In 
fact Monsell (1996) referred to the understanding of executive processes as “a somewhat 
embarrassing zone of almost total ignorance” (p.  93). However, recent work has 
attempted to take on the ambitious assignment of dissecting the homunculus and 
uncovering the executive processes that allow for action selection (Logan, 2003; Logan, 
Schneider & Bundesen, 2007).   
 The empirical study of executive processes requires situations of action selection 
that are demanding enough to necessitate their employment.  Not all actions will require 
executive control, as stimulus-driven, bottom-up processes are often sufficient to guide 
responses to specific environmental stimuli (Logan, 1988).  However, bottom-up 
processes are not always sufficient to guide action selection.  In particular, in situations of 
high conflict, such as those that involve decision making, troubleshooting, or overcoming 
strong habitual responses, top-down processes will be needed to ensure appropriate 
response selection (Norman & Shallice, 1985).  To handle such situations, a top-down 
system that is able to supersede that of lower-level processes is needed to replace lower-
level action biases with the careful, top-down selection processes that are the hallmark of 
volitional behavior (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  Thus, a study of how executive processes 
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guide action selection requires the use of situations that are demanding enough to elicit 
their engagement. 
 One everyday instance of action selection that is likely to require executive 
processes is a multitasking situation.  The need to maintain multiple tasks simultaneously 
or to perform tasks in quick succession requires that the appropriate action be selected, 
engaged, and then quickly disengaged to allow for the subsequent selection of a new 
action.  Experimental paradigms that mimic the demands of real-life multitasking have 
been used to begin to elucidate the executive processes required in action selection (Law, 
Logie, & Pearson, 2006; Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006; Monsell, 2003).   
Task Switching 
 One paradigm that has been particularly fruitful in the study of executive 
processes is task switching (see Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & 
Verbruggen, 2010 for reviews).  In task switching paradigms, participants are instructed 
on the performance of two or more simple tasks.  Following instruction, the participant is 
presented with a series of stimuli, which afford both tasks, and is asked to perform one of 
the tasks on each stimulus in a specified serial order.  Of interest in task switching is not 
performance on the simple tasks themselves, but a comparison of performance on 
repetition trials, in which the current task is the same as that performed on the previous 
trial, and switch trials, in which the current task is different.  The seminal finding is that 
of switch costs: compared to repetition trials, switch trials take more time to perform and 
are more likely to result in error.  Task switches may serve as an empirically testable 
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situation in which action selection and performance depend on processes of executive 
control (Monsell, 2005).   
 Experimental situations that require task switches allow the executive processes 
involved in action selection to be elucidated.  Specifically, task switching research has 
generated a two stage model of how mental representations are selected and activated so 
as to guide task performance (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Logan & Gordon, 2001; 
Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 2001).  If hierarchical representations guide action selection 
then they are likely to do so by influencing one of the two stages within this model.  A 
description of each of these stages as they apply to basic non-hierarchical representations 
is provided below.  Following Allport and Wylie (2000) I will refer to the first stage, in 
which task selection occurs, as the goal setting stage and the second stage, in which the 
parameters of the task set are implemented, as the performance readiness stage. 
Task Selection:  The Goal Setting Stage 
 The task selection processes that occur during the goal setting stage of task 
performance are understood less than those that occur during the performance readiness 
stage.  This is because the majority of task switching studies have chosen to limit the 
process involved in task selection in order to better isolate and examine those processes 
that occur during the second stage of task performance.  Typically, task switching studies 
have employed paradigms that explicitly specify the task that should be performed on 
each trial.  Participants may be instructed to perform tasks in a prespecified order (Rogers 
& Monsell, 2005) or be given task cues that dictate performance on a trial by trial basis 
(Sudevan & Taylor, 1987).  Nevertheless, task selection processes do influence 
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performance.  For example, manipulations that vary the ease with which a cue can be 
processed (Bryck & Mayr, 2005; Rubinstien et al, 2001; Saeki & Saito, 2004; 2009) or 
the transparency with which a cue can lead to the selection of the desired task (Goschke, 
2000; Miyake, Emerson, Padilla & Ahn, 2004; Logan & Schneider, 2006) result in 
changes in the time required to perform that task.  Thus, the role that task selection 
processes play in the task performance can be seen by the contribution this stage makes 
to response time (RT) (Rubinstien et al, 2001).   
 Impacts of the goal setting stage can also be seen within error data.  When task 
selection processes fail to select the specific task required on the current trial an error will 
occur.  Arbuthnott and Frank (2000) used vocal responses in order to differentiate 
between decision errors, in which participants provided the wrong response for the 
correct task (i.e. saying large in response to the cue and stimulus: magnitude - 2) and 
wrong-task errors, in which participants made the correct response for a task that was not 
cued (i.e. saying even in response to the cue and stimulus: magnitude - 2).  These two 
error types did not interact, suggesting that they resulted from different mechanisms.  
Specifically, decision errors were influenced by the complexity of the task required for 
performance on that trial, suggesting that they resulted from task level processes.  
Wrong-task errors on the other hand, were not influenced by task complexity but were 
impacted by the complexity of the transition being performed.  When these errors 
occurred they most often took the form of an uncued task repetition.  Wrong-task errors 
appear to reflect a failure of executive processes to correctly select the new task during 
the goal setting stage. 
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 Task selection processes that occur during the goal setting stage can influence RT 
and error rates during task switching.  However, as will be described below, these 
measures will also be influenced by the performance readiness stage, making explicit 
study of action selection via the task switching paradigm difficult.  Further, as action 
selection that occurs outside of the laboratory is seldom explicitly specified in the 
constrained manner utilized by this paradigm, task switching may not be sufficient to 
capture the processes of action selection that occur when one must select actions in a 
voluntary manner.  Fortunately, Arrington and Logan (2004) have developed a task 
switching procedure that allows for a better examination of the goal setting stage of task 
performance.  The voluntary task switching paradigm uses a bivalent stimulus and allows 
participants to choose which task to perform on each trial.  As in previous versions of 
task switching, voluntary task switching provides a measurement of the time required to 
switch to a new task.  It also provides task choice as a dependent measure capable of 
independently revealing the outcome of the goal setting stage.  During voluntary task 
switching participants are allowed to choose which task to perform on any given trial; 
however, participants are typical given the general instructions to attempt perform tasks 
equally often and randomly. These instructions serve two purposes.  First, these 
instructions ensure that subjects switch between tasks.  The relative speed of repetitions 
compared to switches can lead uninstructed participants to refrain from ever switching 
tasks (Arrington & Weaver, in preparation).  Second, these instructions provide a 
baseline that can be used to reveal biases in task choice.  By assessing whether or not task 
choice deviates from these instructions, the voluntary task switching paradigm can be 
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used to determine the factors that influence action selection.  This paradigm’s ability to 
provide a controlled examination of the factors that influence task selection makes it an 
ideal methodology for examining the influence that hierarchical representations may have 
on action selection. 
 Voluntary task switching. 
 True to its name, task selection in voluntary task switching relies primarily on 
top-down executive processes (Arrington & Logan, 2005).  Task selection appears to be 
an active, task-specific process that can begin prior to the presentation of the specific 
stimulus to which the task will be applied.  Increases in preparation time lead to 
reductions in switch costs, suggesting that participants are using this time to actively 
prepare for the upcoming task (Arrington & Logan, 2004).  Part of this preparation 
involves selecting the task to perform on the upcoming trial.  In voluntary task switching, 
participants are often instructed to order tasks randomly, a requirement that is known to 
require executive control processes (Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998).  To 
fully comply with these instructions participants should perform an equal number of task 
switches and task repetitions.  However, participants tend to perform an increased 
proportion of task repetitions.  Importantly, this repetition bias appears to be especially 
strong when executive control is limited.  Reduction in the preparation time between 
trials increases the repetition bias (Arrington & Logan, 2005), while at long response-to-
stimulus intervals (RSIs) the bias is often reduced or even eliminated (Liefooghe, 
Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009).  Extended preparation time appears to allow 
participants to implement the executive control necessary to create less biased task 
 11 
 
sequences.  Repetition bias is also exaggerated by high working memory (WM) loads 
(Demanet, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2010) and periods of mind 
wandering (Arrington, Stuart, & Weaver, in revision), both of which are thought to rely 
on executive processes (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Teasdale et al., 1995).  
The biases in action selection found in situations that limit executive control suggest that 
when available, executive control processes help to guide bias-free action selection.   
 Yet despite its volitional nature, bottom-up influences on action selection have 
been found during voluntary task switching.  External factors of the stimulus 
environment such as stimulus availability (Arrington, 2008), stimulus repetitions (Mayr 
& Bell, 2006), and ease of stimulus processing (Arrington & Rhodes, 2010) appear to 
affect task selection.  Internal factors such as the load size and content of information in 
WM can also influence choice (Demanet et al., 2010; Weaver & Arrington, 2010).  Task-
specific factors such as task complexity (Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2010; 
Yeung, 2010) and experience-driven factors such as previous stimulus-response (S-R) 
pairings (Arrington, Weaver & Pauker, 2010) and task accessibility (Gollan & Ferreira, 
2009) have also been found to impact action selection. 
 If task selection during voluntary task switching is under volitional control then 
why are patterns of task choice subject to these bottom-up influences?  Arrington and 
Logan (2005) theorized that task choice may be characterized as the result of a 
competition between a representativeness heuristic and an availability heuristic.  The 
competition between these two heuristics can be conceptualized as a horse race and task 
performance will be determined by the winner.  The representativeness heuristic selects 
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the task that will make the pattern of recently performed tasks most closely comply with 
task instructions.  The availability heuristic selects the task that is currently most 
accessible (Baddeley et al., 2001).  Over a series of trials, patterns of task choice will 
reflect the competition of these two heuristics.  Trials guided by the representativeness 
heuristic should ensure that patterns of task choice do not deviate too drastically from 
instruction, while trials guided by the availability heuristic should create a selective bias 
toward more available tasks.  Task choice in voluntary task switching tends to fit this 
pattern.  Participants instructed to perform tasks randomly perform patterns of repetitions 
and switches that are closer to chance than participants who do not receive randomness 
instructions (Liefooghe et al., 2010) suggesting that participants are attempting to 
generate a pattern of task choice that is representative of the instructions they receive.  
Further, factors that have been found to bias task selection, such as S-R bindings and 
stimulus availability, increase the activation of a specific task, thereby making it more 
likely to be selected by the availability heuristic.  Thus task-specific biases are suggestive 
of the availability heuristic’s role in task selection.  Repetition biases can be similarly 
accounted for.  Persisting previous task activation increases availability, and thus the 
likelihood that the task performed on the previous trial will be selected.  As a result, trials 
driven by the availability heuristic will show a bias toward task repetitions.   
 Demanet et al. (2010) suggests that the repetition bias, particularly when it is 
found under conditions of reduced top-down control, may also result from a proportion of 
trials on which the stimulus serves to directly reactivate a response execution before task 
selection is able take place.  According to this view, task selection can be bypassed if a 
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stimulus activates a response before task selection has a chance to occur.  When task 
selection is bypassed, responding will proceed based on the configuration of the previous 
task set.  The result will be a task repetition.  Thus, patterns of task choice will show a 
tendency toward a repetition bias.  The extent of this bias will depend on the top-down 
processes available for task selection.  Under the increased executive control provided by 
extended preparation times, task selection will be more likely to take place and the 
repetition bias will be reduced or even eliminated.  However, when executive processes 
are limited task selection will occur less often such that the repetition bias is increased.  
This pattern is consistent with the effects of top-down control found in voluntary task 
switching.  The proposal receives further support from Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, 
and Vandeirendonck, (2010) who used event-related potentials (ERP) to study lateralized 
readiness potentials (LRP) in participants performing one voluntary task switching task 
with each hand.  The differential pattern of LRPs found on switch and repetition trials 
suggest that the previous task was initially reselected for performance on both switch and 
repetition trials.  The ability to overcome this initial reselection may depend on top-down 
control, such that reselection is more likely to guide task choice when control processes 
are limited. 
 The repetition bias found in voluntary task switching may be due, in part, to trials 
on which the goal setting stage of task performance is bypassed (Demanet et al., 2010; 
Vandamme et al., 2010).  The same explanation was given to account for the high 
proportion of wrong-task errors that are uncued task repetitions within the cued task 
switching paradigm (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000).  It seems that both voluntary and non-
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voluntary task switching can capture instances in which task selection does not occur.  
However, this failure of task selection will be observed more often within the voluntary 
task switching paradigm.  The methods used to specify the to-be-performed task within 
non-voluntary task switching studies, help to ensure task selection by both eliminating 
the uncertainty concerning the task that should be performed next and by aiding in the 
retrieval of the representation of the to-be-performed task (Goschke, 2000).  Further, 
because a task repetition never constitutes an error in voluntary task switching, 
participants may simply not attempt to prevent task reselection on a portion of trials in 
order to take advantage of the ease associated with not having to select the upcoming 
task.   
 Another manner in which strategic attempts to reduce cognitive work during 
voluntary task switching may contribute to a repetition bias is specified by 
Vandierendonck and colleagues (Demanet, 2010).  According to their chain-retrieval 
model for voluntary task switching, participants store chains of task sequences in long-
term memory (LTM).  Task selection occurs by retrieving one chain into WM and then 
selecting tasks according to the sequence indicated by the retrieved chain.  The length of 
each chain will vary depending on the participant’s WM capacity and the demands of the 
voluntary task switching environment, but will typically be between three and six tasks 
long.  Once all of the tasks within a chain have been performed, participants will retrieve 
another chain that can be linked to the chain that has just been performed so as to allow 
for a continuous stream of responding.  For example, if the chain ABA has just been 
performed then the chain ABB may be retrieved next.  The resulting performance output 
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would be the tasks ABABB where the middle A serves as both the last task in the first 
chain and the first task in the second chain.  Participants instructed to perform tasks 
randomly will store chains with an alternation bias in LTM.  However, the fewer 
alternations a chain contains, the more likely it is to be retrieved for performance.  In this 
way participants will attempt to perform tasks randomly but still show a bias that takes 
advantage of the ease with which task repetitions can be performed.  The chain-retrieval 
model assumes that task choice will also be subject to other, less strategic, types of bias.  
Bottom-up processes, such as stimulus-based priming, will guide performance on some 
trials, preventing participants from performing the task dictated by the task sequence they 
are currently holding in WM.   
 Both the heuristic competition explanation of task selection proposed by 
Arrington and Logan (2005) and the chain-retrieval model of task selection proposed by 
Vandierendonck and colleagues (Demanet, 2010) assume that task selection is the result 
of a combination of top-down processes that attempt to comply with instruction and 
bottom-up processes that sometimes override top-down processes and guide task choice.  
The main difference between these models is whether top-down processes guide choice 
in a retroactive manner, in which sequences of tasks that have been performed are 
remembered and used to guide current task performance, or a proactive manner, in which 
sequences of tasks that will be performed are retrieved and then used to guide current 
task performance.  Determining which account of task selection should be endorsed is 
difficult, as whether tasks are selected retroactively or proactively may vary depending 
on individual differences or task context.  Indeed Braver, Gray, and Burgess (2008) have 
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proposed that much of the variability found in cognitive control and WM processes can 
be explained by intrapersonal and interpersonal differences in the extent that retroactive 
and proactive processes are utilized in different situations.   
Task Performance: The Performance Readiness Stage 
 Once a task has been selected within the goal setting stage of task performance, 
the parameters that will govern that task’s performance will need to be activated.  These 
parameters or rules are referred to as the task set.  The task set is a mental representation 
that contains all the parameters needed to bridge the gap between perception and motor 
performance for a specific task.  A number of parameters have been proposed to make up 
task sets including representations of task relevant stimuli, stimulus-category 
classifications, category-response rules, and response thresholds (Logan & Gordon, 
2001).  The particular parameters that make up a specific task set may depend on the 
complexity of the task being performed (Vanderiendonck et al., 2010) and the context.  
The number of parameters included in a specific task set appears to influence the speed 
with which that task set can be activated (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Mayr, 2002) and as a 
result task sets are likely to contain the minimum number of parameters necessary for that 
task’s performance.   
 The performance readiness stage of task performance requires activating the 
appropriate task set.  For novel tasks, new tasks sets that meet the demands of the to-be-
performed task will need to be constructed (Meiran & Kessler, 2008).  Once formed, task 
sets can be stored in LTM and retrieved when that task is encountered again (Bryck & 
Mayr, 2008; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000).  Task sets appear to be held in WM during 
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responding (Rubinstein et al., 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001.)  Parameters of the task set 
may also need to be transmitted to subordinate processes in order for the task to be fully 
implemented (Logan & Gordon, 2001).  Once implemented a task set can guide 
responding.  An activated task set focuses attention on task relevant aspects of a stimulus 
and reduces the extent that information that is irrelevant to or that falls outside of the 
parameters of the current task will influence responding (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; 
2009; Van Dillen, Lakens, & van den Bos, 2011).  The task set then provides the 
appropriate response for that stimulus.  As a single task set includes multiple parameters, 
it can allow for appropriate responses to any number of stimuli that fall within the 
parameters of the task.   
Task Set Reconfiguration 
 The time required to activate a new task set on switch trials appears to be one of 
the largest contributors to switch costs.  However, the specific reason for the increased 
cost on switch trials is debated.  According to the task set reconfiguration view, during 
the performance readiness stage, task set activation is required on switch but not 
repetition trials (Monsell, 2005).  Once a task set is activated it can continue to guide 
performance across multiple repetition trials.  However, when a task switch is required 
the cognitive system must be reconfigured according to the demands of the new task.  
The previous task set must be removed or deactivated and a new task set will need to be 
activated.  Task set reconfiguration, which needs to take place on switch but not 
repetition trials, is thought to take a certain amount of time to accomplish and this added 
time contributes to switch costs.   
 18 
 
 The task set reconfiguration view holds that switch costs are due to top-down 
processes required to instantiate a new task set on switch trials (Monsell, 2003; 2005; 
Rubinstein et al., 2001).  Reconfiguration can begin directly after task selection occurs 
and prior to stimulus presentation (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Sohn & Anderson, 2001).  
This view makes specific claims about how preparation time should affect switch trials.  
For example, within the cued task switching paradigm, in which the to-be-performed task 
is specified via a task cue that precedes the presentation of the stimulus, task set 
reconfiguration will be able to begin as soon as the cue is presented.  Thus, if the cue-to-
stimulus interval (CSI) is long, then task set reconfiguration may be almost finished by 
the time the stimulus is presented and RT, which is measured as the interval between the 
presentation of the stimulus and the performance of the response, would be small.  
However, if the CSI is short then the interval between cue and stimulus presentation 
would not be sufficient to allow for the time consuming reconfiguration processes.  As a 
result reconfiguration of the new task set would still be occurring after the presentation of 
the stimulus, such that RT would be increased.  Consistent with this view, Meiran (1996) 
found that switch costs were reduced with increased CSI.  Importantly, this reduction was 
found even when the total RSI remained constant, suggesting that this decline in RT was 
due to active processes engaged in reconfiguration rather than passive decay of the 
previous task set.   
 While increased preparation does tend to lead to reduced switch costs, the 
temporal relationship between preparation intervals and switch costs is far from straight 
forward.  If switch costs directly reflect the time required to reconfigure the task set, then 
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a one-to-one relationship between increased CSI and reduced switch cost time would be 
expected.  However, large increases in preparation time can lead to relatively small 
preparation benefits (Allport & Wylie, 1999).  Further, significant switch costs remain 
even following CSIs of considerable length (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994).  Multiple 
explanations for these residual switch costs have been proposed by endorsers of task set 
reconfiguration.  De Jong (1992) proposed the failure to engage hypothesis, which notes 
that just because task set reconfiguration can begin upon presentation of the task cue does 
not mean that it always does.  When assessing individual RTs of task switches following 
long RSIs, De Jong found a large distribution of RTs.  The fastest trials had RTs 
equivalent to the fastest RT found on repetition trials, while the slowest RTs in the 
distribution were equivalent to the slowest RT of switch trials that followed short RSIs.  
De Jong proposed that preparation for a task switch is an all-or-none process that 
participants sometimes perform at the presentation of that task cue and sometimes do not 
perform until the presentation of the stimulus.  Residual switch costs are a result of 
averaging the RTs of these two types of trials.  Whether or not active preparation is 
engaged on a particular trial will depend on the participant and the extent to which the 
characteristics of the experiment sufficiently encourage early preparation.  Indeed, 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, and Demanet (2007) found that switch costs 
were eliminated following very brief cue presentations.  Nevertheless, other attempts to 
eliminate residual switch costs have been less successful (Meiran & Chorev, 2005; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and De Jong’s strong claim that task preparation is a single-
step, all-or-none process has been criticized as distributions of task switching data do not 
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always have the mathematical properties of bimodal distributions (Brown, Lehmann, & 
Poboka, 2006).  Others have preferred to account for residual switch costs by proposing 
that reconfiguration can begins following presentation of the task cue, but that cannot 
finish until the actual stimulus is presented (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 
2001).  Under this view reconfiguration includes both those processes that occur during 
the goal setting stage and processes that occur during the performance readiness stage 
and the performance readiness stage cannot be completed until the stimulus is presented.  
For example, Rubinstein and colleagues (Rubinstein et al., 2001) propose a top-down 
control model of task switching that assumes two independent executive components: 
goal shifting and rule activation.  During goal shifting the previously performed task goal 
is replaced within declarative WM with the goal for the new task.  This stage can occur 
following a task cue and prior to the presentation of the stimulus and appears to be 
equivalent to the goal setting stage described above.  During rule activation the specific 
rules that will allow for completion of the task goal are accessed.  This stage follows the 
presentation of the stimulus and is proposed to be the source of residual switch costs.   
Task Set Inertia 
 Task set inertia provides an alternative view of the processes that occur during the 
performance readiness stage (Allport et al., 1994).  According to this view task set 
activation occurs on both switch and repetition trials.  However, task performance will 
take longer on switch trials because of proactive interference.  This interference arises 
because the task set activated on the previously performed trial will influence the speed 
with which the current task can be performed (Wylie & Allport, 2000).  On repetition 
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trials, where the task set is the same as that activated on the previous trial, activation is 
facilitated.  On switch trials, where the to-be-activated task set is different than that 
activated on the previous trial, persisting activation of the previously performed task set, 
or task set inertia, causes task set competition.  The time required to overcome this 
competition and instantiate the new task set on switch trials is proposed to be the main 
source of switch costs. 
 If switch costs are a result of processes associated with activating a new task, as 
proposed by the task set reconfiguration view, then this cost should be dependent on the 
task being switched to.  However, proponents of the task set inertia view note that switch 
costs also seem to be influenced by the task being switched away from (Allport et al., 
1994; Meuter & Allport, 1999).  For example, when Wylie and Allport (2000) had 
participants perform a word reading task on Stroop stimuli (e.g. reading the word “red” 
presented in the color blue) this task took more time to perform if participants had named 
the color of Stroop stimuli on the previous trial than if participants had named the color 
of non-Stroop stimuli.  Further, Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, and Cohen (2006) found that 
switch costs were correlated with the neural activity of the task being switched away 
from rather than the task being switched to.  The more active the region associated with 
the previously performed task, the larger the cost associated with switching away from 
that task.   
 Nevertheless, passive interference processes associated with the task being 
switched to can also contribute to switch costs.  When a task is performed on a specific 
stimulus that stimulus and task become bound in a stimulus-task episode (Hommel, 2002) 
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that is automatically retrieved when that stimulus is encountered again (Logan, 1988).  
As a result, performing a task on a stimulus that previously has been paired with a 
different task takes more time than performing the same task on a novel stimulus 
(Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003).  The effect of S-R 
episodes can be seen following only one pairing of a stimulus and task, can generalize to 
semantically related stimuli (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2004) and remains even 
following intervening trials of another task (Pösse, Waszak, & Hommel, 2006).  Further, 
this effect may interfere with performance to a greater extent on switch trials than on 
repetition trials (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2005), suggesting that the interference 
associated with S-R episodes may contribute to switch costs. 
Backward Inhibition 
 Inhibition applied when switching away from a recently performed task may also 
contribute to switch costs.  In their seminal study, Mayr and Keele (2000) compared the 
cost associated with switching to a task that had been performed two trials ago (ABA) to 
the cost associated with switching to a new task (CBA).  The authors reasoned that if task 
switching is being driven only by activation of the to-be-performed task set, then 
switching back to a task that has recently been switched away from should be easier than 
switching to a new task.  The activation level of the task recently performed would be 
higher than that of a new task and performance would be facilitated.  However, if 
inhibition is being employed during task switches, then switching back to a recently 
performed task should take longer than switching to a new task.  The task recently 
switched away from would also have been recently inhibited and overcoming this 
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inhibition would take longer than switching to a new task.  Consistent with an inhibition 
account of task switching, Mayr and Keele found that switching to a task that had been 
performed two trials ago took longer than switching to a task that had been performed a 
greater number of trials ago.  Inhibition of the task recently switched away from, or 
backward inhibition, has since been replicated using a variety of stimuli, responses, and 
tasks (see Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010 for review).  It seems that backward 
inhibition aids in the ability to switch away from a recently performed task (Hübner, 
Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003).  However, if one is required to switch back to that 
task, this same inhibition can reduce the speed of that switch.  Thus, backward inhibition 
contributes to switch costs.   
 In sum, the task set reconfiguration view holds that during the performance 
readiness stage a new task set will need to be instantiated only on switch trials and switch 
costs are mainly due to the top-down processes required to instantiate a new task set on 
these trials.  The task set inertia view, on the other hand, proposes that the performance 
readiness stage will require the instantiation of a task set on both switch and repetition 
trials.  This view attributes the majority of switch costs to bottom-up processes that 
interfere with performance on switch trials.  However, these two views may not be as 
incompatible as they first appear.  Both views acknowledge that processes such as 
backward inhibition will also contribute to switch costs.  Further, the two views become 
indistinguishable if task set reconfiguration is viewed as a top-down process that 
generates a bias toward the new task rather than a process that explicitly instantiates the 
new task.  The potential compatibility of these two views is made evident by researchers 
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who conclude that switch costs are likely a result of a combination of top-down executive 
processes, as advocated by task set reconfiguration, and bottom-up interfering activation, 
as advocated by task set inertia (Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Meiran, 2000; Vanderiendonk 
et al., 2010).   
 It seems that both the goal setting and performance readiness stages of task 
performance are susceptible to bottom-up biases.  During the goal setting stage, these 
biases can result in performance of an unintended task, while during the performance 
readiness stage they are likely to lead to reductions in the speed and accuracy with which 
the intended task can be performed.  These biases are able to affect action by influencing 
how the mental representations of those actions are selected and implemented.  Top-
down executive processes act on mental representations in order to ensure that intended 
tasks are able to be selected and performed.  The research reviewed thus far has revealed 
that a combination of top-down and bottom-up processes affect action selection and 
performance by influencing the selection and activation of mental representations of 
tasks.  Next I will explore literature on whether the reverse is also true.  Does the nature 
of a mental representation influence the top-down or bottom-up processes that lead to 
task performance?  Specifically, how are the processes involved in action selection and 
performance different for tasks that are represented hierarchically?     
Hierarchical Representations 
 In order to retain high levels of experimental control, tasks that have been utilized 
in voluntary task switching, and in the broader task switching literature, have been quite 
simple.  Single stimulus-dimension categorizations are tied to a limited number of 
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specified responses (Monsell, 1996).  For such “single-step tasks” the task goal, or 
representation of what is to be achieved by a task, is completely accomplished by a single 
instantiation of one task set.  A great deal of information about how mental 
representations at the level of the task set influence task performance and task selection 
has been gained using these simple tasks.  However, outside of the laboratory what is 
meant by the completion of a task is more complex.  Tasks are often made up of multiple 
steps that may be represented hierarchically (Lashley, 1951).  For example, in order to 
complete the task goal of making spaghetti, one of the steps one must take is to boil 
noodles.  As a result it is difficult to say whether the task being performed when heating 
noodles on the stove is a “boiling noodles task” or a “making spaghetti task” or an even 
broader “making dinner task.”  This is just one example of how natural actions are often 
nested within larger and larger task structures made of superordinate component levels 
and nested subcomponents.  If mental representations guide the performance of tasks 
(Vanderiendonck et al., 2010), and actions can be represented at different levels 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), then the level or nature of a task’s mental representation 
should influence the way that task is performed.  Specifically, if one is performing a task 
that is represented hierarchically, then the presence of the broader component structure 
will exert an influence on the actions represented at the subcomponent level (Schneider & 
Logan, 2006).   
 Hierarchical representations can exist at varying degrees of complexity.  For 
example a group of simple S-R associations may become represented hierarchically if 
they become subcomponents that are part of a superordinate task representation 
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(Dreisbach, Goschke, and Haider, 2007).  Likewise, a group of tasks may come to be 
represented hierarchically if they serve as subcomponents that are part of a superordinate 
representation that exerts an influence at the task level (Altmann, 2007).  In order to 
differentiate between tasks that are being represented individually and tasks that are being 
represented as subcomponents within a larger hierarchical representation, I will use the 
term task element to refer to tasks that are being represented as subcomponents within a 
larger hierarchical structure (Lien & Ruthruff, 2004).  The term aggregate task will be 
used to indicate a hierarchically organized task that is made up of multiple task elements.  
Thus in the example above, making spaghetti would be an aggregate task that contains 
the task element of boiling noodles.  Other tasks that would contribute to this larger 
aggregate task, such as making spaghetti sauce would also be included as a task element 
that is part of this aggregate task.  In theory, multiple aggregate tasks may be represented 
within an even larger hierarchical structure; however, the current study will focus on two-
level task representations in hopes of beginning to understand whether and how such 
hierarchical representations influence the selection of the task elements that make up 
those representations.  Specially, the current voluntary task switching study will attempt 
to generate hierarchical representations at the aggregate level.  Voluntary task switching 
typically employs very simple tasks, such as indicating, via a key press, whether a shape 
is a rectangle or an oval.  If superordinate aggregate task-level groupings were created, 
these simple tasks could become task elements that are represented as part of a hierarchy.  
The current study will assess whether such aggregate tasks can be created within free 
choice multitasking environments.  
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Tasks and Task Sets 
The presence of hierarchical task structures in real world action planning has led 
to the speculation that task sets, which allow for the implementation of the parameters 
that guide the performance of tasks during multitasking situations, may also be organized 
hierarchically.  Kleinsorge (2004; Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999; Kleinsorge, Heuer, & 
Schmidtke, 2001; 2004) proposed that task sets themselves are hierarchies whose 
parameters are organized into more and more subordinate components.  If a switch is 
required, the effect of that switch on performance will depend on where that switch is 
located within the task set hierarchy.  When a change occurs, all of the levels below that 
change will need to be reset, such that a change in the highest task-level will require 
complete resetting of all task set parameters and the cost associated with that change will 
be high.  On the other hand, if the change occurs at a lower-level, the parameters that 
make up the top-level of the hierarchy can remain in place and the cost associated with 
that change will be relatively low.   
To test the hypothesis that task sets are hierarchically organized, Kleinsorge and 
Heuer (1999) had participants perform task switching trials within a multitasking 
environment in which both task judgments and compatibility of response-mappings 
varied independently.  On each trial participants saw two numbers and switched between 
making a high or low judgment on the central number and a left or right judgment on the 
position of the peripheral number.  Compatibility of response-mappings also varied, such 
that participants were to make compatible responses (left response for low numbers and 
left position) when the stimuli were green and incompatible responses when stimuli were 
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red.  When participants switched judgments, a cost was incurred, indicating that 
judgments were being represented as two distinct tasks.  When a judgment repeated, 
switching between response-mappings produced a switch cost; however, when a 
judgment switched, performance was slightly quicker if the mapping also switched.  The 
result suggests that each pair of mappings was being represented as a unique level within 
the larger judgment tasks.  Finally, if both the judgment repeated and the compatibility of 
the mapping repeated, then switching responses produced a cost, but no cost for 
switching responses was found when the mapping or judgment also switched, suggesting 
that the actual motor response constituted a third level within the representation of the 
task structure.  It seems that participants represented their actions within a tri-level 
hierarchical task space that included task judgments, response-mapping, and motor 
responses.   
Not all evidence has supported the view that task sets are hierarchical organized 
(Allport et al., 2004; Hübner, Futterer, & Steinhauser, 2001; Kleinsorge et al., 2001; 
Logan & Gordon, 2001; Vandierendonck, Christianens, & Liefooghe, 2008).  In fact 
when Hübner et al. (2001) had subjects switch between three task sets, they found an 
additive pattern of parameter switches, such that the size of the switch cost increased with 
the number of task dimensions that switched, regardless of the specific level of those 
parameters.  An additive effect of parameter switches has been found when switching 
between three tasks (Hübner et al., 2001; Kleinsorge et al., 2001) and when switching 
between two tasks (Logan & Gordon, 2001).  Yet another view has been endorsed by 
Vanderiendonck et al. (2008).  They propose that the parameters within a task sets are all 
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bound together without any specific organization.  According to this “flat view” of task 
sets, each time a switch of any one of the parameters within a task set is required, the 
entire task set will need to be reconfigured.  As a result switch costs will be similar 
regardless of the specific parameters or number of parameters within a task set that need 
to switch.  How the parameters within a task set are organized may vary depending on the 
specific task being represented and the context in which that task is being performed.   
 The parameters that make up an individual task set may or may not be organized 
hierarchically; nevertheless, a task set can be viewed as a hierarchical representation 
when the actions guided by this representation are compared to actions guided by more 
basic S-R associations.  Dreisbach et al. (2007) demonstrated that actions that are 
represented as tasks are subject to switch costs while the same actions, when represented 
as individual S-R associations, are not.  For example participants who learned to switch 
between making a first letter vowel/consonant judgment for words presented in red (e.g. 
when the stimulus is red press the left key if the first letter in the word is a vowel and 
press the right key if the first letter is a consonant) and making an animal/non-animal 
judgment for words presented in blue (e.g. when the stimulus is blue press the left key if 
the stimulus is not an animal and the right key if the stimulus is an animal) showed 
switch costs when switching between tasks; however, participants who learned that the 
word “raven” presented in red required a right hand response and the word “hedgehog” 
presented in blue required a right hand response made the same responses to the same 
stimuli as those who represented their actions as tasks but showed no switch costs when 
performing these actions based on basic S-R associations.  For subjects representing their 
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performance as tasks, the task served as a larger component structure in which the 
individual S-R associations were nested and this component structure influenced the 
nature of the subcomponent responses, indicating the presence of a hierarchical 
representation.   
Hierarchical representations, as indicated via switch costs, are found even when 
the S-R pairings required by the tasks being switched between are identical (Mayr & 
Bryck, 2005).  In fact when one switches tasks, performing the same response can 
actually lead to worse performance than when a switch in tasks also involves a switch in 
response (Meiran, 2000).  This finding may seem counterintuitive given that both task 
repetitions and response repetitions that are part of the same task lead to performance 
benefits (Meiran, 2000).  However, the finding can be readily explained if each task is 
being represented as a hierarchical structure that includes responses as subcomponents.  
For example a right key press response may be represented as “low” when performing the 
magnitude task and “odd” when performing the parity task.  If a switch between these 
tasks leads to a response repetition, then the differential representations of that response 
(i.e. “low” and “odd) can compete and actually slow responding despite the fact that the 
physical motor response itself is being repeated.      
Task Ensembles  
 Task ensembles are a type of aggregate task that contains task elements that must 
be performed in specific sequence.  For example, within the alternating runs paradigm, 
popular in the task switching literature, participants are asked to perform tasks in a 
repeating ABBA sequence (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).  This procedure was designed to 
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create runs of trials containing both task repetitions and task switches.  A recently 
discovered unintended consequence of these instructions is that in addition to 
representing A and B as laterally distinct tasks, participants tend to represent the 
repeating ABBA sequence as an overarching aggregate task made up of individual A and 
B task elements (Altmann, 2007).  The hierarchical representation of task ensembles, also 
referred to as task chunks, is revealed by the influence on performance the repeating 
sequence has on the task element level.  For items represented individually, task 
repetitions result in quicker and more accurate performance than switches.  Therefore, if 
all tasks within the alternating runs paradigm were represented individually, then 
repeating task A on trial five should result in the same level of performance as repeating 
task B on trial three.  However, this is not the case.  Instead the performance of the fifth 
trial results in a large performance cost that can even exceed the switch cost found when 
moving between tasks A and B (De Jong, 1995; Koch, Philipp, & Gade, 2006; Lien & 
Ruthruff, 2004; Schneider, 2007; Schneider & Logan, 2006; 2007).  The presence of this 
cost associated with the first trial of an ensemble suggests that each task ensemble is 
being represented hierarchically and that the entire ABBA sequence is functioning as an 
aggregate task.  Moving between aggregate tasks eliminates the benefit of repetitions at 
the level of the task elements.  Thus the fifth trial repetition when performing a repeating 
ABBA ensemble is often performed at speeds similar to that of the fifth trial switch 
within a repeating AABB ensemble (Schneider & Logan, 2007).  It seems that one cannot 
benefit from task element repetitions if that repetition spans two different aggregate tasks. 
In this case hierarchical task structures are revealed by the change they produce in the 
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speed of repetitions at the task element level.  However, hierarchical representations can 
also be revealed by a change in the speed with which task switches are produced at the 
task element level.  Task switches that occur within the same aggregate task will take less 
time than task switches which span an aggregate task. The current study will take 
advantage of these differences in within-aggregate and between-aggregate task switch 
speed in order to help determine whether hierarchical representations can be formed 
within a free choice multitasking environment.   
 The performance effects of switching and repeating actions appear to be 
consistent regardless of the hierarchical level at which the action is being represented.  
Switching from an ABBA task ensemble to an AABB task ensemble results in a larger 
increase in RT than when either type of task ensemble is performed in succession 
(Schneider & Logan, 2006).  Just as switching between task elements results in a 
performance cost compared to repeating task elements, switching between aggregate 
tasks results in a cost compared to repeating aggregate tasks.   
  In sum, hierarchical action representations exist.  Individual tasks can be 
represented as being made of subcomponents (Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999) or as being the 
components that make up a larger superordinate aggregate task (Lien & Ruthruff, 2004).  
The hierarchical nature of the mental representation changes the way that task 
performance occurs.  However, these previous findings of hierarchical representations 
have been found within situations in which task element order was constrained.  In each 
case it was the experimenter and not the subject who determined the specific serial order 
in which the task elements should be performed.  Are hierarchical representations also 
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found in situations where subjects are free to order tasks themselves? In order to 
determine if this is the case it is necessary to understand under what situations 
hierarchical representations are found.      
When Are Hierarchical Representations Found? 
 Current evidence from the multitasking literature suggests that participants are 
somewhat inclined to represent actions hierarchically whenever they recognize that the 
task environment supports a hierarchical structure.  For example, Schneider (2007) 
effectively induced hierarchical representations by requiring participants to perform six 
trials in a memorized order.  He informed participants that thinking of the six trial 
sequence as two pairs of triplets would make the sequence easier to remember.  
Consistent with his suggestion, participants appeared to represent the series of trials as 
two task ensembles.  However, explicit knowledge tends to induce hierarchical 
representations even when such a representation is not suggested by the experimenter.  
Dreisbach et al. (2007) demonstrated that knowledge that S-R pairings could be 
represented as pairs of tasks was sufficient to cause participants to create task 
representations, even when the learning environment supported a more simple direct S-R 
pairing representation.  In their study, words were categorized as animal or non-animal or 
beginning with a consonant or vowel.  The specific task to be performed on each stimulus 
was indicated by the color the stimulus was presented in.  Groups of participants learned 
to respond to stimuli either with or without knowledge of the underlying task rules that 
dictated the assignment of stimuli to responses.  At the start of the experiment, 
participants in the informed condition were told these task rules while participants in the 
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uninformed condition were never explicitly told that the actions they would be 
performing could be considered tasks.  During the experiment all participants were taught 
the specific responses to be performed for each of the eight stimuli used in the study.  S-R 
pairings were introduced at a slow rate that allowed each to be memorized before new 
pairings were presented.  Though all participants were exposed to this same learning 
environment, different patterns of data were found in each condition.  Participants in the 
uninformed condition performed switches and repetitions at similar speeds and with 
similar accuracy.  However, participants who were informed of the task rules prior to 
learning the S-R pairings showed significant switch costs.  Participants informed about 
the task rules appear to have represented their actions as tasks and performance was 
impaired when they switched between those tasks.  However, when the same actions 
were represented as simple S-R pairings, no switch costs were found.  Further, when it 
was casually mentioned to a third group of participants, who were uninformed about the 
task rules at the start of the study that the S-R pairings they had already learned could be 
represented as tasks, these participants showed switch costs in the next block of trials.  
Even though these participants had learned and practiced representing each task as a 
sequence of unassociated S-R pairings, mere knowledge of the existence of task rules 
caused participants to begin representing the pairings as tasks.  This change was found 
both when the stimuli were long and difficult to remember and when the stimuli were so 
short and easy to memorize that representing them as tasks actually impaired 
performance.  Thus, explicit knowledge appears to be sufficient to allow for and 
encourage actions to be represented hierarchically.   
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 Even without any explicit knowledge or suggestion, participants appear inclined 
to represent actions in a hierarchical task structure to the extent that the task environment 
is suggestive of this structure.  Spatial and temporal manipulations of stimuli can lead to 
the spontaneous adoption of hierarchical representations.  For example the temporal 
overlap in stimulus presentation within the psychological refractory period paradigm, in 
which two stimuli, each requiring a response are presented on each trial, can lead the two 
tasks to be represented as a task ensemble (Luria & Meiran, 2003).  A similar finding was 
demonstrated by Lien and Ruthruff (2004) within the task switching paradigm.  Over a 
progression of experiments, the authors gradually manipulated the extent that a series of 
magnitude and parity tasks appeared as a task ensemble.  First the RSI between task 
ensembles was increased relative to the RSI within task ensembles.  Then the spatial 
array where stimuli were presented was manipulated to make the tasks appear less and 
less like a continuous stream of trials and more and more like repeating sets.  The extent 
that tasks were represented as ensembles was measured by comparing the performance of 
the first trial in a task ensemble when it was a task-level repetition but an ensemble-level 
switch to the first trial in a task ensemble when it was a task-level switch but ensemble-
level repetition.  During the first experiment, when no manipulation to the task 
environment was made, there was a strong benefit for task-level repetitions, suggesting 
that task elements were not being represented hierarchically.  However, as the task 
environment changed to become more and more suggestive of the presence of task 
ensembles, the pattern of performance changed too, so that the task-level repetition 
benefit was reduced and then replaced with larger and larger task ensemble-level switch 
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costs.  Participants adopted a hierarchical representation based on the stimulus structure 
of the tasks they were performing. 
 Participants appear to readily adopt hierarchical representations when performing 
tasks within a multitasking situation in which task order has been predetermined.  Will 
such hierarchical representations also be found in multitasking situations in which 
participants are free to order tasks themselves?  This is likely to depend on the reason that 
these representations are adopted and whether or not that reason is applicable within 
voluntary task switching environments.  Three potential functions of a hierarchical 
representation are considered below. 
Performance of Task Elements 
  Hierarchical representations may serve to increase the speed and accuracy with 
which the individual task elements that make up that representation can be performed.  
First, representing actions hierarchically may aid in action preparation.  Rubinstein et al. 
(2001) proposed that performing actions is a two-stage process wherein one must first 
shift to the upcoming goal and then activate the rules associated with the performance of 
that goal.  Schneider (2007) speculated that if a set of actions is represented as a number 
of different individual tasks, then performance of those actions will depend on the time 
required to shift to and activate the rules associated with each one.  However, 
representing a series of tasks as one aggregate task allows all of the task elements within 
that aggregate task to be part of the same goal, such that the time required during the goal 
shifting stage is reduced.  As a result each task element can be performed more quickly.  
Koch et al. (2006) highlight another potential benefit of representing a series of tasks as a 
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single aggregate task.  They found that participants with explicit knowledge that the 
series of task switching trials they were performing was a repeating task ensemble 
showed less backward inhibition within blocks of trials that were made up of ensembles.  
Representing a series of tasks as an aggregate task appears to reduce the level of 
inhibition that is applied to its task elements.  Thus, task elements represented within a 
hierarchy may benefit from increased speed of preparation and reduced levels of 
inhibition. 
 Representing tasks hierarchically may aid in the performance of the task elements 
within that aggregate task.  However, performance benefits are not universal, and 
hierarchical representations appear to be adopted even when they do not lead to superior 
performance (Dreisbach et al., 2007).  Indeed, plan specific knowledge can sometimes 
interfere with the task specific processes required to carry out that plan (Logan, 2007).  
Therefore, whether or not a hierarchical representation is adopted is not likely to be a 
product of the functional benefit that representation provides at the task element level. 
Memory for the Serial Order of Task Elements 
 Another benefit of representing multiple individual task elements within a single 
hierarchical task structure is that doing so allows the entire group of actions to be stored 
and retrieved from memory as a single unit.  Grouped representations are learned more 
easily (Gobet et al., 2001) and held more efficiently in WM (Wolters & Raffone, 2008).  
Thus, hierarchical representations allow for the potential action planning limitations 
inherent in a limited capacity system to be overcome.   
 If the hierarchical representations that have previously been found within the task 
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switching literature are adopted primarily to help retain task elements within a specified 
serial order, then this type of representation would not be expected to generalize to a 
voluntary task switching environment that contains aggregate tasks other than task 
ensembles.  When performing task ensembles, representing that ensemble hierarchically 
would be beneficial, as a hierarchical representation would make remembering the order 
that task elements should be performed in easier (Schneider, 2007).  Having advance 
knowledge of the task to be performed in the upcoming trials leads to quicker and more 
accurate performance (Dreher, Koechlin, Ali, & Grafman, 2002; Kleinsorge & Gajewski, 
200; Sohn & Carlson, 2000).  Thus, even when explicit memory of the task sequence is 
not required, the performance benefit associated with being able to plan for the upcoming 
task may be sufficient to encourage participants to hold the sequence in memory.  
However, if the hierarchical representations found in task ensemble studies are primarily 
a product of the requirement to perform tasks in a specific, prespecified order, then 
hierarchical representations would not be expected within voluntary task switching where 
one can choose which task to perform on a trial by trial basis, such that retention of 
memorized sequences is not required.  In fact within a free choice environment, 
remembering multiple task elements at once could cause interference during task set 
selection, which could slow performance.  Therefore, if memory for serially ordered tasks 
is the primary function of hierarchical representations then hierarchical representations 
would not be expected to be formed within a voluntary task switching environment.  
Action Organization and Selection 
 The inclination that participants display to represent actions hierarchically may be 
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an indication of a general tendency to utilize hierarchical representations in everyday 
action planning situations (Lien & Ruthruff, 2004).  Hierarchical representations could 
serve as a mechanism for organizing all of the specific elements that make up an 
aggregate task in a way that becomes particularly beneficial in situations where task order 
is not explicitly specified.  When task sequencing is unconstrained, action selection can 
be subject to bottom-up influences such as task set inertia (Vandamme et al., 2010), S-R 
bindings (Arrington et al., 2010), and task set inhibition (Lien & Ruthruff, 2008).  Top-
down control is required to overcome these influences and produce volitional behavior 
(Weaver & Arrington, invited revision).  Representing actions within a hierarchy may be 
a mechanism that helps to hamper bottom-up influences so that less control is required.  
For example, if one needs to perform three individual tasks, then top-down control 
processes will be needed after the performance of each task in order to overcome the 
interference associated with the previously performed task and ensure that the appropriate 
new task is selected.  However, if these three tasks are represented within a single 
hierarchical representation, then action selection and performance processes would be 
subject to less interference (Koch et al., 2006; Schneider, 2007).   
 Dreisbach and Haider (2008; 2009) propose that one function of task sets is to 
focus attention and prevent processing of irrelevant stimulus information that can 
interfere with performance.  They demonstrated this function by comparing performance 
for participants maintaining a task set to those storing more basic S-R mappings 
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2009).  In their study participants viewed compound stimuli made 
up of the name of a piece of clothing superimposed over a line drawing of either a piece 
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of clothing or an animal.  Responses were made to the words based on either direct S-R 
mappings or based on task rules (i.e. does this item cover the leg).  Participants who 
made responses using S-R bindings showed compatibility effects for clothing stimuli, 
such that they were faster to respond to stimuli for which the word and the picture led to 
the same response, and for animal stimuli, such that they were faster to respond to stimuli 
when the animal faced the direction of the to-be-performed  response.  Participants who 
made responses using task representations showed compatibility effects for clothing but 
not for animal stimuli.  Animal information, which was not relevant to the task goal, was 
able to be ignored when participants adopted a task representation.  Task representations 
appear to shield the task goal such that stimulus information not relevant to that goal fails 
to capture attention.   
 Hierarchical representations may serve a similar goal shielding function.  By 
focusing attention only on those task elements that are part of the aggregate task, 
hierarchical representations could help constrain action selection.  While this constraint 
may not always specify the particular order in which task elements that are part of that 
hierarchy would be performed, it would limit the number of options from which to 
choose.  For example, when performing the aggregate task make spaghetti the 
environment in which one would perform this task (i.e. the kitchen) is likely to contain 
stimuli which afford this and many other tasks.  As stimuli have the ability to 
automatically activate the tasks that they afford (Logan, 1988) simply entering the 
environment could lead to the activation of a number of potential tasks that would 
compete with the making spaghetti goal for performance.  If this goal were not being 
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represented hierarchically then one would need to overcome this competition each time 
they switched tasks (e.g. when switching to the boil noodles task and again when 
switching to the make sauce task).  Representing making spaghetti within a hierarchical 
task structure could help to reduce this competition by focusing attention on only those 
tasks elements that are part of the aggregate task goal.  Thus, one would still need to 
decide whether their first task should be to boil noodles or make sauce, but task elements 
that fall outside of the aggregate task, such as load the dishwasher or eat a banana, would 
not be in direct competition.  This reduced competition would help to reduce the time 
associated with choosing a new task (Arrington & Logan, 2005).  Thus, rather than a 
product of the need to remember task order in situations in which tasks must be 
performed in a specified sequence, hierarchical representations may serve as a functional 
mechanism that aids in task selection within situations in which task order is 
unconstrained.  If hierarchical representations serve this goal shielding function, then the 
benefit they have the potential to provide to task selection will sometimes become a cost, 
such as when required to move between the performance of task elements that belong to 
different aggregate tasks.  This would make hierarchical representations similar to other 
cognitive mechanisms that serve to automate action performance; at times executive 
control will be required to overcome the more automatic cognitive process and ensure 
appropriate task performance (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; Norman & Shallice, 1986).    
 Hierarchical Representations in Voluntary Task Switching 
 A hierarchical representation is a representation made up of components and 
nested subcomponents, where the structure of the components influences the 
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subcomponent level (Schneider& Logan, 2006).  Previous research on aggregate level 
hierarchical task representations has been constrained to the study of task ensembles.  
Within a task ensemble the order in which task elements must be performed is 
constrained.  The current study will attempt to demonstrate that other types of aggregate 
tasks also exist.  Specifically, using the voluntary task switching paradigm, the current 
study will assess whether hierarchical representations of aggregate tasks can be more 
abstract, such that the task elements that make up an aggregate task can be maintained 
independent of any specific serial order that would constrain task choice. 
 Use of the voluntary task switching paradigm within the current study will also 
allow for a new assessment of the formation of hierarchical representations.  
 Previously, the influence that components have on the subcomponent level has been 
assessed only in measures of performance.  Specifically, within a non-voluntary task 
switching paradigm evidence of the presence of a hierarchical representation could only 
be assessed by examining whether or not the existence of an aggregate task level, 
changed the speed or accuracy with which the task elements that were part of that 
aggregate task were performed.  When assessing the existence of hierarchical 
representations within a voluntary task switching environment it is possible to examine 
potential changes in both task performance and task selection.   
   The use of the voluntary task switching paradigm in the current study allows for 
an assessment of the formation of hierarchical representations using both choice and 
performance measures.  If hierarchical representations are found in voluntary task 
switching, then they may exert separate influences on task choice and performance.  
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Indeed, task selection and task performance processes appear to be somewhat dissociated.  
Within voluntary task switching, correlations between performance measures such as 
switch costs and task choice measures such as the probability of switching are quite small 
(Arrington & Yates, 2009; Mayr & Bell, 2006).  Further, using the Attention Networks 
Test (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002) Arrington and Yates (2009) 
found that selection and performance measures in voluntary task switching were 
associated with different attentional networks.  Additionally, manipulations which 
influence voluntary task switching performance do not necessarily influence choice 
measures (Arrington & Weaver, in revision; Butler, Arrington, & Weywadt, 2011).  
These discrepancies demonstrate the dissociation between the processes involved in the 
selection and performance of actions. 
 This dissociation between the processes that guide task choice and the processes 
that guide task performance mirrors the division of processes proposed in several models 
of task switching.  Task switching has repeatedly been conceptualized as a two-step 
process.  For example, Allport and Wylie (2000) distinguish between “goal setting” 
which determines which task is performed and “performance readiness” which 
determines how quickly that task is able to be performed.  A similar distinction between 
“goal shifting” and “rule activation” has been made by Rubinstein et al. (2001) and 
between “task level” and “parameter level” representations by Logan and Gordon (2001).  
Within the voluntary task switching paradigm factors which influence the first, goal 
setting step would be expected to  influence  task choice and performance speed, while 
 44 
 
those that influence the second, performance readiness step should only influence task 
performance.   
 Previous research has demonstrated that hierarchical representations affect 
performance (Dreisbach et al., 2007; Schneider & Logan, 2006).  As a result hierarchical 
representations are expected to influence task performance within the current study.  If 
actions are being represented hierarchically, then the cost of switching between task 
elements that are part of the same aggregate task should be less than the cost associated 
with switching between task elements that belong to different aggregate tasks.  As choice 
measures have not previously been assessed, it is unclear whether or not hierarchical 
representation will have an influence on choice.  Nevertheless, there is reason to expect 
that hierarchical representations will affect choice as well as performance.  Schneider 
proposed that hierarchical representations act on the first goal setting stage of task 
switching.  Since this is the stage which determines task choice, a factor that influences 
this stage is likely to influence task choice.  In his proposal, Schneider suggested that 
hierarchical representations exert their influence on this goal setting stage of  by making 
the entire aggregate task, including all task elements, available at once, which he 
proposed reduced the time required to complete this stage of task switching.  Indeed, Lien 
and Ruthruff (2004) found that the cost of switching into an ensemble increased as the 
complexity of that ensemble increased, suggesting that selection of a task ensemble may 
occur as a whole.  If selecting one task element that is part of an aggregate task requires 
selection of the entire hierarchical representation, then all of the task elements within an 
aggregate task would be expected to be initially reselected on the following trial.  As a 
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result participants would be expected to be more likely to switch between task elements 
that are part of that same aggregate task than to switch between task elements that are 
part of different hierarchical representations.  This expected influence of hierarchical 
representations on task choice is consistent with hierarchical representation’s proposed 
purpose of aiding in the organization and selection of actions by shielding against 
information that is irrelevant to the current goal (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; 2009).  
Specifically, hierarchical representations may focus attention on task elements that are 
part of the current aggregate task in order to ensure that all of the task elements that make 
up that aggregate task are completed. If this is indeed the function of hierarchical 
representations, then this bias would be expected within the current voluntary task 
switching study, despite the voluntary task switching instructions to perform all task 
elements equally often and in a random order.  When performing tasks within the current 
free choice multitasking environment, hierarchical representations are expected to 
influence action selection by making participants more likely to choose to perform tasks 
that are part of the same hierarchical representation as the task performed most recently.   
Experiment 1: Hierarchical Representations in Voluntary Task Switching 
 The current study explores the effect of aggregate tasks, or hierarchically 
organized tasks that include multiple task elements, on action selection during voluntary 
task switching.  Previous research has found evidence for the existence of hierarchical 
representations in multitasking environments.  The present work extends these findings 
by assessing whether or not and under what circumstances such hierarchical structures 
are adopted within the free choice multitasking environment created by the voluntary task 
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switching paradigm.    
 Experiment 1 included four conditions, a control condition and three hierarchical 
conditions.  As hierarchical representations have not previously been induced within a 
free choice multitasking environment, three manipulations of increasing complexity were 
employed in order to ascertain the conditions in which hierarchical representations are 
utilized (See Table 1).    
 Previously, hierarchical representations have been elicited via explicit instructions 
(Schneider, 2007) and via spatial and temporal stimulus manipulations (Lien & Ruthruff, 
2004; Tlauka & McKenna, 2000).  The hierarchical conditions in the current study used 
these three design features to introduce the task elements in a hierarchical manner.  Using 
a cover story described in detail below, participants were explicitly told that the first two 
task elements they practiced were part of one aggregate task and that the second two task 
elements were part of another.  Participants practiced task elements that were part of the 
same aggregate task in the same spatial location on the screen and practice blocks were 
temporally grouped according to aggregate task.  This hierarchical introduction was in 
direct contrast to that used in the control condition, in which each task element was 
referred to as an individual task, was practiced in a separate spatial location, and was 
introduced as part of a continual temporal sequence.   
 All manipulations in the introduction condition took place only during the 
practice phase of the study.  The additional two hierarchical conditions supplemented 
these introduction manipulations with manipulations that were continued within the 
multitasking portion of the experiment.  In the after effect condition, the performance of 
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each task element was followed by an after effect (i.e. the stimulus moved horizontally to 
the right or left until it exited the screen), with the specific effect that occurred being 
determined by the aggregate task that was performed.  As these after effects occurred 
during both the practice and multitasking portions of the study, they reminded 
participants of the hierarchical task structure throughout the experiment.  The final 
hierarchical condition, the forced choice condition, went beyond reminding participants 
of the hierarchical structure by requiring maintenance of this structure throughout the 
experimental session.  On a randomly selected 10% of trials the stimulus appeared in one 
of the locations in which the aggregate tasks had been practiced.  On these forced choice 
trials, participants were required to choose to perform one of the task elements that made 
up the associated aggregate task.  Successful completion of these forced choice trials 
required that participants establish and maintain aggregate task-level groupings.  Because 
subjects could not predict when a forced choice trial would occur, aggregate task-level 
groupings had to be maintained throughout the study with the forced choice condition.   
 Arrington, Altmann, and Carr (2003) found that the time required to switch 
between similar tasks is less than that required to switch between dissimilar tasks.  
Therefore, aggregate tasks that are made up of similar task elements may appear to be 
represented hierarchical simply because of this similarity.  To avoid this potential 
confound in the current study, the specific task elements that made up each aggregate 
task were counterbalanced between participants.  For example, if the task elements A and 
B belonged to the first aggregate task for one participant, then a different participant 
would experience task elements A and C as part of the first aggregate task.  Thus, any 
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effects of the properties of the individual task elements or their combinations were 
controlled for.   
 Naturally, occurring aggregate tasks are often made up of task elements that are 
more similar to each other than task elements that are part of different hierarchies.  By 
controlling for potential similarities between task elements, the current experiment 
provides a stringent test of whether or not hierarchical representations can be formed 
within free choice multitasking environments.  It also prevents the current results from 
being influenced by any preexisting impressions of similarity participants may have 
based on previous experience with a particular hierarchy.  Thus, if hierarchical task 
representations can be found to guide task choice in the current study, then hierarchical 
representations in which the connection between task elements is more inherently 
apparent, would also be expected to influence action selection.  Nevertheless, the 
somewhat arbitrary nature of the pairings used in the current study is not unlike some 
hierarchies found outside of the laboratory.  For example, Lien and Ruthruff (2008) 
describe how hierarchies can come to exist between seemingly arbitrary or unrelated 
activates simply because they happen to be in the same location.  If one’s dry cleaner is in 
the same shopping center as their post office, while their gas station is in a different 
location, then that person may come to group going to the dry cleaner and going to the 
grocery store into one larger “running errands” aggregate task that would not include 
getting gas.  The activities are grouped, not because picking up dry cleaning is more 
similar to getting groceries than to getting gas, but simply because these two activities 
have something in common with each other that they do not have in common with getting 
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gas, they share a geographic location.  Thus one similarity can be enough to generate a 
hierarchical representation.  In the current study, manipulations, which will be described 
in detail below, were used to indicate a commonality between the randomly paired task 
elements.     
 In order to assess whether hierarchical representations were adopted in the current 
study, analyses focused on two potential aggregate structure influences.  First building on 
the previous literature reviewed above, the RT measure of task performance was used to 
assess the formation of hierarchical representations via an influence on performance.  If 
participants were representing task elements hierarchically, the speed with which 
participants switched between task elements that were part of the same aggregate task 
(within-aggregate task switches) should be faster than the speed with which participants 
switched between task elements that were part of different aggregate tasks (between-
aggregate task switches).  However, if hierarchical representations were not established 
then all task switches should be performed at similar speeds regardless of the aggregate 
task to which the task elements belonged.  The control condition provided a baseline 
switch speed to which the hierarchical conditions could be compared.  Second, the use of 
the voluntary task switching paradigm allowed for an assessment of the formation of 
hierarchical representations via an influence on task choice.  The proportions of within-
aggregate task switches and between-aggregate task switches were compared.  If task 
elements were being represented hierarchically then a greater proportion of within-
aggregate task switches than between-aggregate task switches was expected.   
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Methods 
 Participants. 
Sixteen Lehigh University undergraduates participated in each condition (for a 
total of 64 participants) in exchange for partial course credit or for $10.  All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 Apparatus and stimuli. 
The experiment was administered on a Dell Dimension computer running the E-
prime 1.1 software package.  Stimuli were a series of shapes that varied on four 
dimensions.  Stimuli were either short or long, round or rectangular, solid or outlined, and 
oriented vertically or horizontally (see Figure 1).  Short stimuli were two cm high and 
one cm wide when vertically oriented.  Long stimuli were three and a quarter cm high 
and one cm wide when vertically oriented.  Stimuli were black and appeared on a light 
gray background.  During single task practice blocks, stimulus location varied by 
condition.  In the control condition, stimuli for each of the four tasks appeared in separate 
quadrants of the screen, such that stimuli for the first task element appeared five cm to 
the left and five cm above the center of the screen, stimuli for the second task appeared 
five cm to the left and five cm below center, and stimuli for the third and fourth tasks 
appeared in corresponding top and bottom positions on the right side of the screen.  In the 
hierarchical conditions stimuli were centered vertically on the screen with stimuli for the 
first aggregate task presented five cm to the left of the center of the screen and stimuli for 
the second aggregate task presented five cm to the right of center.  During the 
multitasking practice block and all experimental blocks, all stimuli appeared in the center 
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of the screen in all conditions, with the exception that stimuli in the forced choice 
condition appeared either five cm to the left or right of the screen’s center on forced 
choice trials.  Responses were mapped to the a, s, d, f, j, k, l and ; keys of a standard 
QWERTY keyboard.  The two responses for each task were mapped to corresponding 
fingers of each hand.  Specific S-R mappings were counterbalanced with the constraint 
that task elements belonging to the same aggregate task were always mapped to 
contiguous fingers.   
 Procedure. 
At the start of the experimental session participants were told that they would be 
playing the role of a quality control officer for a production plant.  The computer would 
output symbols that represented products and their job was to assess the quality of those 
products by classifying the associated symbols.  Throughout the study each of the 
classification tasks the participants performed were referred to as quality measures the 
participants should monitor.  Four classification tasks, corresponding to the four 
dimensions of stimulus variation were employed.  The size quality measure required 
judging the stimulus as short or long, the shape quality measure required judging the 
stimulus as round or rectangular, the fill quality measure required judging the stimulus as 
solid or outlined, and the orientation quality measure required judging the stimulus as 
oriented vertically or horizontally.  The order in which the tasks were introduced was 
randomized, such that there was a random pairing of the specific categorization tasks that 
made up each “quality control” aggregate.   
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All participants were told that they would begin by monitoring a quality measure 
for production line A.  They were then introduced to and practiced performing the first 
task element within a 20-trial practice block.  Participants were then introduced to and 
performed a 20-trial practice block for each of the remaining three task elements.  The 
labeling whereby these elements were introduced varied by condition.  In the control 
condition each task element was introduced as being a quality measure for a different 
production line, such that participants monitored production lines A, B, C, and D in 
sequence.  In the hierarchical conditions the second task element was introduced as a 
second quality measure for production line A and the third and fourth task elements were 
introduced as being quality measures for production line B.  The spatial locations that 
task elements were practiced in also varied by condition.  In the control condition, the 
stimuli on which participants practiced each task element appeared in a different location 
of the screen, such that participants practiced monitoring line A in the top-left location, 
line B in the bottom-left location, line C in the top-right location, and line D in the 
bottom-right location.  In the hierarchical conditions, stimuli appeared in the left position 
when monitoring line A (i.e. five cm to the left of the center of the screen) and in the 
right position when monitoring line B.  A temporal grouping manipulation was also 
employed.  In the control condition, participants received instructions for the next task 
element directly after finishing the practice block for the previous task element.  In the 
hierarchical condition, task elements that belonged to the same aggregate tasks were 
temporally grouped.  After practicing the task elements that belonged to the same 
production line participants were presented with a reminder screen displaying the S-R 
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mappings for those task elements and were asked to take a minute to review the keys for 
that production line.  The S-R mappings remained on the screen until participants 
indicated they wanted to move on.  This screen created a temporal gap between learning 
of the two task elements that made up each aggregate task. 
After performing the four individual task practice blocks, all participants received 
multitasking instructions.  Participants were asked to choose the specific task element to 
be performed on any given trial, but were instructed to attempt to perform each task 
element equally often and in a random order.  Participants performed this procedure in a 
final 20-trial practice block before completing 16 64-trial experimental blocks.  On each 
trial a randomly-selected stimulus was presented and remained on the screen until a 
response was made.  On all trials within the control, introduction, after effect conditions 
and on 90% of trials in the forced choice condition, the stimulus appeared in the center of 
the screen and participants chose to perform any one of the four task elements on that 
stimulus.  A 500-ms RSI displaying a fixation cross in the center of the screen separated 
each trial.   
An after effect manipulation was implemented within the after effect and forced 
choice conditions.  During the RSI the stimulus moved horizontally from its position in 
the center of the screen to the right or left until it appeared to move off the screen.  The 
direction that the stimulus moved depended on the specific task element that had been 
performed.  If the task element was part of the first aggregate task (Line A), then the 
stimulus moved to the left; if it was part of the second aggregate task (Line B), then the 
stimulus moved to the right. 
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The forced choice condition contained a small number of forced choice trials.  On 
five percent of trials in this condition the stimulus appeared on the left side of the screen 
and on five percent of trials the stimulus appeared on the right side of the screen.  A 
fixation cross marked the center of the screen on these trials.  Participants were instructed 
that when the stimulus appeared in one of these locations they should choose to monitor 
one of the two measures for that production line (i.e. one of the Line A measures when 
the stimulus appeared on the left and one of the Line B measures when the stimulus 
appeared on the right).  On these forced choice trials only responses associated with one 
of the appropriate task elements would advance the participant to the next trial. 
Results 
 Voluntary task switching trials were sorted into tasks based on response and into 
task transitions based on the tasks performed on trial n and trial n-1.  Data from four 
participants in the control condition, two participants from the introduction condition and 
two participants in the after effect condition were removed because their accuracy fell 
below 90%.  The first trial of each block, error trials, and trials following an error were 
excluded from the RT and choice analyses (8.3% of trials), as transitions could not be 
coded for these trials.  Within the forced choice condition, forced choice trials and trials 
following forced choice trial were also excluded from analysis (19.5% of forced choice 
condition trials, 5.4% of total trials).  Trials with RTs two standard deviations above a 
participant’s mean RT were trimmed, resulting in a loss of 3.7% of trials.  In order to 
ensure reliable data, a participant’s data was excluded from the RT and choice analyses if 
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they could not contribute at least 20 data points to each cell within the RT analysis
1
.  As a 
result these analyses included 12 participants in the control condition, 13 participants in 
the introduction condition, 14 participants in the after effect condition and 14 participants 
in the forced choice condition. 
 In order to directly compare the types of transitions made in the control condition 
to the transitions made within the hierarchical conditions, the first two task elements and 
last two task elements introduced to participants in the control condition were coded as 
being part of the same aggregate task.  The aggregate task structure of this experiment 
created three types of transitions.  On each trial participants could repeat the task element 
performed on the previous trial (repetition), switch to the other task element that 
belonged the same aggregate task as the task performed on the previous trial (within-
aggregate switch) or switch to one of the two task elements that belonged to the 
aggregate task not performed on the previous trial (between-aggregate switch).  If 
participants switched evenly between all four tasks as instructed, then one fourth of 
transitions would be repetitions, one fourth would be within-aggregate switches, and one 
half would be between-aggregate switches (one fourth to each of the two between task 
elements).  In order to directly compare switch probability across transition type, each 
                                                 
1
 Data from one participant in the introduction condition and two participants in the forced choice condition 
were excluded from the RT and choice analyses because they did not contribute a sufficient number of data 
points to each cell in the analyses.  If transitions were made with the expected frequency, subjects should 
contribute at least 256 data points to each cell in the design.  In previous research using the voluntary task 
switching paradigm, participants who do not perform each type of transition on at least ten percent of trials 
have been excluded from analysis.  The requirement to produce at least 20 of the 256 possible instances of 
any type of transition was chosen in order to create a criterion that was slightly more conservative than the 
ten percent required in the literature.  A failure to contribute at least 20 data points to any cell indicates that 
the participant did not select tasks in a random order as instructed.   
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participants’ mean between-aggregate switch probability was divided by two prior to 
being submitted to analysis.    
 Response time.   
 RT was assessed as one measure for determining under what conditions 
hierarchical representations are found during free choice multitasking environments.  If 
the four task elements performed during the multitasking phase are being represented as 
two aggregate tasks, then based on previous task ensemble research regarding how 
hierarchical representations affect task element performance, within-aggregate task 
switches should take less time than between-aggregate task switches.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, RT was assessed as a function of transition and condition.  Mean RTs are 
displayed in Figure 2.  An inspection of Figure 2 reveals that responses in the forced 
choice condition, which had the longest RTs of all of the conditions, were performed 
significantly more slowly than responses in the after effect condition, which had the 
shortest RTs.  No other differences in response speed by condition reached significance.  
As expected based on previous task switching literature, repetitions were performed more 
quickly than either type of switch across all conditions.  Of primary interest was the 
comparison between within-aggregate and between-aggregate switches.  Within-
aggregate and between-aggregate switches were performed at similar speeds in the 
control, introduction and after effect conditions.  However, within-aggregate switches 
were performed more quickly than between-aggregate switches in the forced choice 
condition suggesting the presence of a hierarchical representation within that condition.  
These observations were supported by a 3(transition: repetition, within-aggregate switch, 
 57 
 
between-aggregate switch) x 4(condition: control, introduction, after effect, forced 
choice) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with transition as a within-subject factor and 
condition as a between-subject factor.  The analysis found a main effect of transition, 
F(2,48)=40.96, p<.001, ηp
2
=.63, and a main effect of condition, F(3,49)=2.88, p<.05, 
ηp
2
=.15.  These effects were qualified by a significant transition x condition interaction, 
F(6,98)=2.29, p<.05, ηp
2
=.12.  Planned contrasts comparing within-aggregate and 
between-aggregate switches in each condition found a significant difference only in the 
forced choice condition, F(1,13)=8.33, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.39.  No differences in the speed of 
within-aggregate and between-aggregate switches were found in the control condition, 
F(1,10)=0.31, p=.59, the introduction condition, F(1,12)=1.11, p=.31, or the after effect 
condition, F(1,13)=0.042, p=.84.   
 Task choice.  
 Next task choice was assessed as a second measure for examining whether 
hierarchical representations were established within the current free choice multitasking 
environment.  Figure 3 displays the proportion of transitions as a function of transition 
and condition.  If hierarchical representations that influence action selection were induced 
in the current experiment, then subjects would be expected to make a greater number of 
within-aggregate switches than between-aggregate switches.  Inspection of Figure 3 
indicates that the probability of within-aggregate and between-aggregate switches 
appears to vary as a function of condition.  No differences between within-aggregate and 
between-aggregate switch probabilities were found in the control or introduction 
conditions; however, the predicated increased proportion of within-aggregate relative to 
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between-aggregate switches was found in the after effect and forced choice conditions.  
In order to statistically verify these observations, analyses of task choice focused on the 
proportion of each type of switch performed in each condition.  The analysis used to 
assess hierarchical representations in RT (i.e. a 3(transition) x 4(condition) RM-ANOVA) 
would be an inappropriate measure of task choice due to the interdependence of the 
proportion of repetitions, within-aggregate switches and between-aggregate switches 
performed in each condition.  In order to assess task choice, the proportion of total 
switches (i.e. within-aggregate switches and between-aggregate switches but not 
repetitions) that were within-aggregate switches was calculated for each condition.  If 
subjects were switching between all tasks in a random order as instructed then one-third 
of their total switches should have been within–aggregate switches and two-thirds of their 
total switches should have been between-aggregate switches.  A series of one-sample t-
tests comparing the proportion of within-aggregate switches in each condition to the 
expected value of one-third confirmed that the proportion of total switches that were 
within-aggregate switches did not differ from one-third in the control condition 
(M=0.34), t(11)=0.36, p<.72 or the introduction condition (M=0.34) , t(12)=0.62, p<.54.  
This comparison was significant in both the after effect condition (M=0.38), t(13)=2.64, 
p<.05, and the forced choice condition (M=0.39), t(13)=3.08, p<.01.  The proportion of 
total switches that were within-aggregate switches did not vary as a function of condition, 
F(3,49)=1.95, p=.13. 
 Inspection of this Figure 3 also reveals that the repetition bias reported in previous 
voluntary task switching studies was present in this data, such that the probability of 
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performing task repetition was high, regardless of condition.  The presences of this bias 
was confirmed by a series of one sample t-tests comparing the proportion of repetitions 
performed to the proportion of repetitions expected if subjects were switching between all 
four tasks in a random order as instructed (.25).  Significant differences from the standard 
were found in the control condition (M=.40), t(11)=2.78, p<.05, the introduction 
condition(M=.39), t(12)=2.10, p<.05, the after effect condition (M=.49), t(13)=4.02, 
p<.01, and the forced choice condition (M=.40), t(13)=2.96, p<.01.  The large repetition 
biases seen in the current study are not surprising as the proportion of repetitions 
performed tends to increase with increased working memory loads (Demanet et al., 
2010).  The need to retain the S-R rules for the large number of tasks in this study likely 
served to tax working memory thereby increasing the likelihood that subjects would 
repeat the task performed on the previous trial. 
 Additional analyses. 
 Accuracy was high (M=96.3%) and did not vary by condition, F(3,159)=1.68, 
p=0.17.  Accuracy data were not analyzed as a function of transition due to the difficulty 
associated with attempting to infer the specific task element participants attempted to 
perform on error trials.  Previous voluntary task switching studies, in which participants 
performed the responses associated with each task on a single hand, have coded errors 
under the assumption that participants choose the correct hand (or task) but incorrect 
finger on error trials (Arrington & Logan, 2004).  In the current study, in which the two 
responses for each task were mapped to corresponding fingers of different hands, it is 
difficult to determine whether participants intended to perform the task mapped to the 
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finger used for that response (e.g. index finger) but incorrectly selected the specific finger 
(i.e. left instead of right) that was appropriate for the current stimulus or selected the 
correct hand for the intended task but pressing the wrong digit (e.g. left index finger 
instead of left middle finger).  Thus performance analyses were limited to measures of 
RT.   
The specific categorization tasks assigned to each aggregate-task and the specific 
order in which participants were introduced to each task was randomized and therefore 
was not likely to vary as a function of condition.  This assumption was verified in a series 
of ANOVAs on RT and choice as a function of categorization task and task order.  The 
associated means and F values are reported in the appendix.  Differences by 
categorization task were small, inconsistent and did not vary by condition.  Analysis of 
task order produced no significant differences.  These analyses confirm that the RT and 
task choice findings reported above were not likely to be a byproduct of the specific 
categorization task pairings or task order utilized in each condition.   
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 assessed whether hierarchical representations could be found within 
a free choice multitasking environment by looking for an influence of the aggregate task 
structure on task performance and task choice.  Support for the formation of hierarchical 
representations was found.  Participants in the forced choice condition displayed longer 
RTs when switching between aggregate tasks than when switching within aggregate 
tasks.  Further, participants in both the forced choice and after effect conditions showed a 
tendency to make a greater proportion of within-aggregate task switches than expected by 
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chance.  Nevertheless, this result must be interpreted with caution as proportion of 
switches that were within-aggregate in these conditions did not vary from that found in 
the control condition.     
 Aggregate task influences were found in both the RT and choice measures in the 
forced choice condition.  Interestingly, an effect on choice but not RT was found in the 
after effect condition.  While within-aggregate and between-aggregate switches were 
made at similar speeds in this condition, a slightly greater proportion of within-aggregate 
than between-aggregate switches were performed.  Previous task switching studies have 
demonstrated the presence of aggregate task representations via changes in response 
speed (e.g. Lien & Ruthruff, 2004).  Task choice had not previously been assessed within 
a hierarchical task environment.  It was therefore unclear whether hierarchical 
representations would influence choice.  The current results suggest that not only is task 
choice influenced by hierarchical representations but that measures of choice may 
actually be more sensitive to the formation of hierarchical representations than 
performance measures.  This increased sensitivity may be indicative of the role that 
hierarchical representations may play in action selection.  If as asserted above, one 
function of hierarchical representations is to guide action selection by shielding the 
currently selected aggregate task from interference associated with other potential tasks it 
would be expected that evidence of this shielding may be especially likely to manifest 
itself in a measure of choice.     
 The strongest evidence for the formation of a hierarchical representation was 
found in the forced choice condition, where existence of the hierarchical task structure 
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was evident in both choice and performance measures.  On ten percent of trials in the 
forced choice condition participants were required to choose only from tasks that were 
part of a specified aggregate task.  Successful performance of these forced choice trials 
mandated that participants remember aggregate task pairings.  These forced choice trials 
were intended to encourage the formation of a hierarchical representation by ensuring 
that subjects maintained and attended to the specific task elements that belonged to each 
aggregate task.  The manipulation appears to have been successful in establishing a 
persistent hierarchical representation that influenced performance throughout the 
multitasking portion of the experiment.  As is evident in Figure 4 the influence of the 
hierarchical representation was not any stronger directly following the performance of a 
forced choice trial.  In fact a t-test comparing the proportion of between-aggregate 
switches performed on trials which directly followed forced choice trials (M=0.39) to the 
proportion of between-aggregate switches performed on trials which did not follow a 
forced choice trial (M=0.38), found no significant difference in the type of transitions that 
were likely to be performed on the trial following a forced choice trial, t(13)=0.50, 
p=0.62.  Thus forced choice trials appear to have aided in the creation of a hierarchical 
representation which influenced performance throughout the experiment rather than 
simply increasing the speed or proportion of within-aggregate switches performed 
directly following a forced choice trial. 
 No evidence of a hierarchical representation was found in the introduction 
condition.  This result is somewhat surprising given the apparent inclination to adopt 
hierarchical representations found in previous task switching studies (Altmann, 2007; 
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Schneider, 2007).  The introduction condition utilized three hierarchical manipulations 
previously found to induce hierarchical representations (e.g Schneider, 2007; Lien & 
Ruthruff, 2004), including explicit experimenter suggestion.  However, even 
experimenter expectation was not effective in inducing behavior representative of a 
hierarchical representation.  Why were the manipulations used in the introduction 
condition unsuccessful in inducing a hierarchical representation in the current study?  
Two possible explanations of the failure for hierarchical representations to be induced in 
the introduction condition are considered.  First, the strong hierarchical representation 
found in the forced choice condition may have resulted from the need for participants to 
perform forced choice trials.  On ten percent of trials in the forced choice condition 
participants were required to choose only from tasks that were part of a specified 
aggregate task.  Successful performance of these forced choice trials mandated that 
participants remember aggregate task pairings.  None of the other conditions within 
Experiment 1 required this explicit maintenance of aggregate task structure, so this 
requirement may have ensured that a hierarchical representation established during the 
instruction phase was maintained in the forced choice condition.  Hierarchical 
representations may only be maintained in situations where memory of aggregate task 
structure is required, such as those involving maintenance of an ordered task ensemble 
(Schneider & Logan, 2006).  RTs in the forced choice condition were longer than those 
found in the other conditions suggesting that representing a collection of task elements 
within hierarchical task structures may hinder performance, perhaps by increasing WM 
load.  Hierarchical representations which both slow and speed responding have been 
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found previously (Dreisbach et al., 2007).  If hierarchical task structures reduce the speed 
with which task elements can be performed within the current free choice environment, 
then participants may be unwilling to maintain such structures unless they are required.  
Further, prior to the multitasking portion of the experiment subjects received instructions 
to attempt to perform each of the task elements equally and in a random order.  Subjects 
may have avoided representing tasks hierarchically in the current context in order to 
ensure better compliance with these instructions.  So even if a hierarchical representation 
had been induced via the introduction manipulations that occurred during practice, this 
representation would have been abandoned once multitasking performance began, as 
maintenance of this structure was not required by the multitasking portion of the 
experiment in these conditions. 
 Alternatively, strong hierarchical representations may have been found within the 
forced choice condition of Experiment 1 because this was the only condition that was 
successfully able to establish such a representation.  The introduction condition attempted 
to induce a hierarchical representation by using manipulations that have previously 
proven effective in creating a hierarchical structure within a non-voluntary task switching 
paradigm.  However, unlike in previous studies where these manipulations occurred 
throughout the experimental session (Altman, 2007; Schneider, 2007), in the current 
study all of these manipulations occurred during the practice phase of the experiment, in 
which participants were also required to memorize S-R mappings for four different task 
elements.  At this time participants’ primary goal was learning to perform the individual 
task elements.  This taxing goal may have prevented them from learning aggregate task 
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structures at this time.  Thus the formation of hierarchical task structures may be similar 
to the acquiring of a new skill.  Before one can learn complex behaviors, the basic actions 
that compose these behaviors must be well learned (Rosenbaum, Cohen, Jax, Weiss, & 
van der Wel, 2007).  Likewise, aggregate tasks may not be created until the task elements 
that would make up the aggregate task have been firmly established.  If so then the failure 
of the introduction condition to induce a hierarchical representation would be 
unsurprising.  Formation of such a representation would require that aggregate task 
manipulations occur following the learning of task elements.  Both the after effect 
condition and the forced choice condition meet this requirement; however, the forced 
choice condition meets it more strongly.  While the after effect condition includes an 
aggregate task manipulation throughout the multitasking portion of the experiment, it 
does not require that participants attend to this manipulation.  This would explain why the 
after effect condition did not establish as strong a hierarchical representation as that 
found in the forced choice condition, which required that participants attend to and 
remember the hierarchical task structure during the multitasking portion of the study. 
Experiment 2: The Persistence of Hierarchical Representations 
 Experiment 1 was successful in finding conditions in which hierarchical task 
representations could be induced within a free choice multitasking environment.  
Experiment 2 assessed the stability of such hierarchical representations.  Are hierarchical 
representations maintained only in those situations where they are explicitly required for 
performance, or is it the case that once established, a hierarchical representation will 
continue to influence performance in situations where it remains applicable, regardless of 
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whether or not it is strictly required?  Understanding under what conditions hierarchical 
representations are maintained could provide insight into the potential role of these 
representations.  A hierarchical representation that is quickly established when needed 
then quickly abandoned when it is no longer required would be able to serve as a flexible 
mechanism of executive control that could be implemented strategically as needed 
(Logan & Crump, 2011).  Conversely, a hierarchical representation that becomes firmly 
established with use is likely to be maintained, and in time come to be automatically 
implemented, when cued by the appropriate context (Logan, 1988).  Such a 
representation would be able to serve as a means for increasing behavioral stability 
without depleting cognitive resources (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).      
 In order to address the question of whether influences of hierarchical 
representations will be maintained in situations where they are not strictly required, the 
forced choice manipulation of Experiment 1 was used within the first half of Experiment 
2.  The participants were informed that the last half of the experiment would not contain 
any forced choice trials.  This allowed performance and choice measures in the first half 
of the study, in which a hierarchical representation was required to be compared to 
performance and choice measures in the last half of the study, where it was not.   
Methods 
 Participants.   
 Sixteen Lehigh University undergraduates participated in Experiment 2 in 
exchange for partial course credit.  All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
none had participated in Experiment 1. 
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 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure. 
 The apparatus and stimuli were the same as those used in the forced choice 
condition of Experiment 1.  The procedure was also highly similar to that used in the 
forced choice condition.  As in Experiment 1, the stimuli were introduced in a 
hierarchical manner during the practice phase.  Participants were once again informed 
that they would be working as quality control officers whose job would be to assess 
quality by classifying symbols that represented products from different production lines.  
As in the forced choice condition of Experiment 1, the first two task were said to be from 
Production Line A while the second two tasks were said to be from Production Line B. 
Spatial and temporal manipulations occurred during the practice phase of the experiment 
and after effects occurred during both the practice and multitasking portion of the study.  
As in Experiment 1, the multitasking portion of the study consisted of 16, 64-trial blocks.  
The first half of the experiment included forced choice trials, in which the stimulus 
appeared either five cm to the right or left of the center of the screen and participants 
were required to perform one of the two task elements that belonged to the aggregate task 
which had been associated with that side of the screen during practice.  Forced choice 
trials occurred on a randomly selected ten percent of trials during the first half of the 
experiment.  After completing eight experimental blocks, the experimenter informed the 
participant that during the remainder of the experiment stimuli would always appear in 
the center of the screen and they would be able to choose between all four of the task 
elements on each trial.  No forced choice trials appeared during the subsequent eight 
experimental blocks.  After effects occurred throughout both halves of the experiment.   
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Results 
Voluntary task switching trials were sorted into tasks based on response and into 
task transitions based on the tasks performed on trial n and trial n-1.  Data from two 
participants whose accuracy fell below 90% were removed from analysis.  Forced choice 
trials and trials following forced choice trials were not analyzed (9.8% of total trials).  
The first trial of each block, error trials, and trials following an error were excluded from 
the RT and choice analyses (12.5% of trials).  Trials with RTs two standard deviations 
above a participant’s mean RT were trimmed, resulting in a loss of 2.3% of trials.  Data 
from one participant was excluded from the RT and task choice analyses because they 
could not contribute at least 20 data points to each cell within the RT the RT analysis. As 
a result these analyses included 13 participants. 
Figure 5 displays mean RTs and mean proportion of transitions as a function of 
switch type and block.  Inspection of this figure reveals that differences in the 
performance speed of within-aggregate switches relative to between aggregate switches 
as a function of block were minimal.  A similar lack of variation in the proportion of 
within-aggregate relative to between-aggregate switches performed across blocks is 
evident.  However, the large number of blocks in the current experiment, combined with 
the small amount of subjects that contributed to each block
2
, prevents an analysis by 
block from being highly informative.  It is likely that such an analysis would not have 
sufficient power to capture a switch type by block effect even if it were present.  Thus, 
                                                 
2
 When data was dived as a function of block and transition, two participants were found to have not 
performed all three types of transitions in every block.  Thus an analysis which included block would only 
be able to include 11 participants. 
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the analyses within the current study will compare response speed and task choice as a 
function of experiment half.  
Response time. 
RT was assessed as a measure of the maintenance of hierarchical representations 
during each half of the study (see Figure 6).  Participants showed an expected effect of 
practice, responding overall more quickly during the second half of the experiment.  The 
extent that RT was reduced with practice was greater for both types of switches (within-
aggregate and between-aggregate switches) than it was for repetitions.  Also as expected, 
repetitions were performed more quickly than either type of switch.  Surprisingly, within-
aggregate switches were found to be faster than between-aggregate switches during the 
last half of the study but not during the first half.  A 3(transition: repetition, within-
aggregate switch, between-aggregate switch) x 2(half: first, last) repeated-measure 
ANOVA confirmed a main effect of transition, F(2,11)=14.53, p<.01, ηp
2
=.73; a main 
effect of half, F(1,12)=23.45, p<.001, ηp
2
=.66; and a marginally significant transition x 
half interaction, F(2,11)=3.24, p<.08, ηp
2
=.37.  While the pattern of means was in the 
expected direction, planned contrasts found that RTs for within-aggregate and between-
aggregate switches did not significantly differ from each other during the first half of the 
study, F(1,12)=2.97, p=.11, ηp
2
=.20 .  Nevertheless, within-aggregate switch RTs were 
significantly faster than between-aggregate switch RTs during the last half of the 
experiment, F(1,12)=4.85, p<.05, ηp
2
=.29.   
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 Task choice. 
The proportion of transitions as a function of transition and half are displayed in 
Figure 7.  The pattern of transitions replicates that seen within the forced choice 
condition of Experiment 1 and appears stable in both the first and last half of the study.  
As in Experiment 1, task choice was assessed by calculating the proportion of total 
switches that were within-aggregate switches.  A paired sample t-test comparing the 
proportion of within-aggregate switches in the first and last half of the study found no 
differences across experiment half, t(12)=0.01, p=.99.  Additionally, one sample t-tests 
comparing the proportion of total switches that were within-aggregate switches to one-
third, confirmed the effect to be significant in the first half of the study (M=0.41), 
t(12)=2.53, p<.05 and marginally significant within the last half (M=0.41), t(12)=2.03, 
p=.06.  After collapsing across half, the proportion of total switches that were within-
aggregate switches (M=0.41) varied significantly from one-third, t(12)=2.15, p<.05, 
suggesting the presence of a hierarchical representation.   
The repetition bias seen in Experiment 1 was also present in the current 
experiment.  The proportion of repetitions performed in the first half of the experiment 
(M=0.37), significantly exceeded the expected value of .25, t(12)=2.62, p<.05, while the 
proportion of repetitions performed in the last half of the experiment (M=0.36) showed a 
marginal difference, t(12)=1.77, p=.05. 
Additional analyses. 
Accuracy was high (M=96.4%) and did not vary by half, F(1,12)=0.20, p=0.66.  
Categorization task and task order were assessed for potential influences on RT and task 
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choice during each half of the study (see Appendix).  As in Experiment 1 differences by 
categorization task were small and importantly, did not vary as a function of half.  No 
effect of task order was found in any analyses.  Thus the aforementioned effects on RT 
and task choice do not appear to be a byproduct of the specific categorization tasks or 
task orders used in this experiment.   
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 assessed whether hierarchical representations would be found only 
in situations in which they were required or whether such representations would continue 
to influence performance once they had been established, regardless of whether or not 
they were strictly required.  To do this I used the forced choice manipulation from 
Experiment 1 to establish a hierarchical representation during the first half of the study 
then removed this manipulation during the second half of the study and examined the 
effect that the removal of this requirement had on RT and choice.  The results were clear, 
evidence of the maintenance of a hierarchical representation were found in the second 
half of the study in both the RT and choice measures.  It seems that once a hierarchical 
representation has been established, this representation will continue to influence 
performance, even when maintenance is not strictly required. 
 In Experiment 1 the forced choice condition was associated with increased RT 
compared to conditions in which a hierarchical representation had not been firmly 
established.  This finding led to the speculation that hierarchical representations may 
place an increased load on WM thereby impairing performance.  If hierarchical 
representations result in impaired performance then participants may seek to improve 
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performance by only maintaining hierarchical representations in cases where they are 
strictly required.  The results of Experiment 2 speak against this interpretation of 
Experiment 1.  Though participants in both Experiment 2 and the forced choice condition 
of Experiment 1 experienced the same manipulations, both of which appeared to result in 
the formation of a hierarchical representation, RTs in Experiment 2 (M=1201) were faster 
than those found in the forced choice condition of Experiment 1 (M=1488) and more 
consistent with those found in the other conditions of that experiment (M=1171).  
Research directly assessing the potential load incurred by maintenance of a hierarchical 
representation is desirable; nevertheless, hierarchical representations do not always 
appear to lead to performance impairments.  It is likely then, that the failure to find 
hierarchical representations in the introduction condition in Experiment 1 was due to a 
failure to firmly establish a hierarchical representation during the practice portion of this 
study rather than a failure of an established representation to be maintained during the 
multitasking portion of the study.   
 A significant effect of hierarchical representation on RT was found in the last but 
not first half of the study.  This lack of effect was somewhat surprising given that the first 
half of this experiment was a direct replication of Experiment 1.  Maintenance of the 
aggregate task structure was required during this first half of the study in order to 
complete the forced choice trials.  The result suggests that hierarchical task 
representations may take time to become fully formed.  However, this interpretation 
should be made with caution as the pattern of RTs during the first half of the study was in 
the expected direction.  In fact the difference in RT between within-aggregate and 
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between-aggregate switches in the first half of the experiment (68 ms) was numerically 
larger than the difference between within-aggregate and between-aggregate switches in 
the last half (56 ms) indicating that the lack of significance may simply be a result of 
increased variance in the first half of the study.  This increased variance is not surprising 
as the need to exclude forced choice trials and trials following forced choice trials from 
this half of the study reduced the total number of trials contributing to the analysis.  
Further, subjects had less experience with the experimental procedure during the first half 
of the study than during the second half, a condition that is also likely to lead to increased 
variance.  Thus it is likely that hierarchical representations were formed during the first 
half of Experiment 2, but RT analysis did not have significant power to capture the effect.  
This reduced power also likely contributes to the size of the effects found in the first half 
of the experiment which were smaller than those found in Experiment 1.  Whereas the 
forced choice condition of Experiment 1 analyses included 16 blocks of 64 trials, the first 
half of Experiment 2 included only eight blocks.  The lack of power within this 
experiment is a limitation that seems to have made the data within the entire experiment 
somewhat unstable.  Increasing the power in this study by either increasing the number of 
participants or the number of trials in this study would be required if the results of each 
half are to be compared to Experiment 1. 
 Once again, choice measures appeared more sensitive to the formation of 
hierarchical representation than performance measures.  Despite the reduced power of the 
first half, choice measures showed a significant effect of hierarchical representation 
during both the first and last half of the experiment.  This finding is consistent with the 
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increased sensitivity of choice measures to detect hierarchical structure found in 
Experiment 1, where RT measures showed evidence of a hierarchical task structure only 
within the forced choice condition but choice measures suggested that a hierarchical 
structure was present in both the forced choice and after effect conditions.  It seems that 
as a hierarchical structure becomes established, this structure begins affecting choice 
measures prior to displaying an influence on RT.   
 Across two experiments, conditions have been found that led to the formation of 
hierarchical representations within free choice multitasking environments.  Within such 
environments, hierarchical representations appear to exert an influence on both task 
choice and performance.  Once it has been established, this influence appears somewhat 
sustained despite changes in the requirements to maintain aggregate-task pairings.  Now 
that the ability for hierarchical representations to exert an influence on choice has been 
found, the next question of interest is by what mechanisms do hierarchical 
representations exert this influence.  One potential mechanism is considered in 
Experiment 3.    
 Experiment 3: Are Hierarchical Representations Activated as Wholes? 
 The goal of Experiment 3 was to begin to uncover the mechanisms by which 
hierarchical representations exert an influence on task choice and performance during 
free choice multitasking environments.  One potential candidate is that action selection 
may be affected because hierarchical representations are activated as a whole.  Schneider 
(2007) proposed that adopting hierarchical representations may cause all of the task 
elements within an aggregate task to be shifted to simultaneously during the goal shifting 
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stage of task switching (Rubinstein et al., 2001).  If all of the task elements within an 
aggregate task are switched to in unison then switching between these task elements 
would be facilitated.  Such a mechanism would explain the pattern of reduced RT for 
within-aggregate switches compared to between-aggregate switches found in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  If all of the task elements that belong to an aggregate task are 
switched to in unison, then the time required to select and perform the first task within a 
sequence of task elements that are part of the same aggregate task should depend on the 
number of task elements within that aggregate task.  Specifically, the more task elements 
an aggregate task contains, the more time an aggregate-task switch should take.  Indeed 
Lien and Ruthruff (2004) found that participants took longer to switch to more 
complicated task ensembles, suggesting that aggregate tasks may indeed be selected as a 
whole.  However, in their study the complexity of each aggregate task was determined by 
the number of switches within that task ensemble, a measure that would not apply to 
aggregate tasks in which task order is unconstrained.  A more direct assessment of 
whether all of the task elements within an aggregate task are selected simultaneously is 
therefore required.   
  Experiment 3 attempts to determine whether or not hierarchical representations 
are activated as wholes by comparing the speed of between-aggregate switches for 
aggregate tasks with differential complexities.  If switching to a task element that is part 
of a hierarchical representation requires activating the entire representation, then 
switching to the more complicated aggregate task should take more time than switching 
to the less complicated aggregate task (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Mayr, 2002).  In addition, 
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if the effort of selecting an aggregate task depends on the complexity of that task, then 
the probability of making between-aggregate task switches may decrease as the 
complexity of those aggregate tasks increases.  Once a complex aggregate task has been 
activated, maintaining that hierarchical representation over a larger number of trials 
would be functional.  Indeed, Yeung (2010) found that when voluntarily switching 
between tasks that differed in ease of performance, participants continued to perform the 
more difficult task once that task set had been established for a greater number of trials 
than they will continue to perform an easy task.  Thus, if the task sets for all task 
elements within a hierarchical representation are activated in unison then participants 
should be more likely to switch between task elements that are part of a complex 
aggregate task than to switch between task elements that are part of a simple aggregate 
task, even after correcting for the number of available transitions in each condition.   
 In order to test these hypotheses subjects were introduced to two aggregate tasks 
of varying complexity.  Task complexity was manipulated by varying the number of task 
elements contained within an aggregate task.  The more complex aggregate task was 
made up of three task elements while the less complex aggregate task consisted of only 
two task elements.  The manipulations used in the forced choice condition of Experiment 
1 were used to induce hierarchical representations.  Subjects were explicitly informed 
that they would be monitoring two production lines.  During the introduction spatial and 
temporal manipulations encouraged subjects to distinguish between the quality measures 
that belonged to each production line.  The formation of hierarchical representations was 
further encouraged by after effects and forced choice trials.  Following data collection the 
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speed and proportion of within-aggregate switches made within the more and less 
complex aggregate tasks were compared in order to determine whether or not aggregate 
tasks were being activated as wholes.   
Methods  
 Participants. 
  Sixteen Lehigh University undergraduates participated in Experiment 3 in 
exchange for partial course credit.  All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
none had participated in Experiment 1 or 2. 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure. 
The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure for Experiment 3 differed from that used in 
the forced choice condition of Experiment 1 in the following ways.  Participants 
performed five task elements, three belonging to one aggregate task and two belonging to 
the other.  The specific aggregate task that contained three task elements (line A or line 
B) was counterbalanced.  An extra dimension of variability was added to the stimuli in 
order to create a fifth classification task.  Stimuli were either black or white and a shade 
quality measure required classification of stimulus color.  In order to allow for the 
performance of five tasks, responses were mapped to the q, w, e, r, v, n, u, i, o, and p keys 
and participants used all ten fingers to respond.  As in the previous experiments, the two 
responses for each task were mapped to the same finger of each hand and S-R mappings 
were counterbalanced among participants.  The manipulations of hierarchy that occurred 
during the forced choice condition of Experiment 1 were used in the current experiment.  
During the practice phase subjects were explicitly told which task elements belonged to 
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which production line.  Temporal and spatial separation of the task elements within each 
aggregate task occurred during practice.  Aggregate task-dependent after effects occurred 
during both the practice and multitasking portion of the experiment and forced choice 
trials occurred on a randomly selected ten percent of trials during the multitasking portion 
of the study.  
Results 
 Voluntary task switching trials were sorted into tasks based on response and into 
task transitions based on the tasks performed on trial n and trial n-1.  Data from two 
participants whose accuracy fell below 90% were removed from analysis.  Forced choice 
trials and trials following forced choice trials were not analyzed (19.5% of trials).  The 
first trial of each block, error trials, and trials following an error were excluded from the 
RT and choice analyses (6.5% of trials).  Trials with RTs two standard deviations above a 
participant’s mean RT were trimmed, resulting in a loss of 1.9% of trials.  Data from one 
participant who did not contribute at least 20 data points to each cell within the RT 
analyses was excluded from the RT and choice analyses, such that 13 participants were 
included in these analyses. 
 Response time. 
 Mean RTs as a function of transition and aggregate task complexity are displayed 
in Figure 8.  If aggregate tasks are accessed as a whole, then it should take more time to 
make a between-aggregate switch to a more complex aggregate task than to make a 
between-aggregate switch to a less complex aggregate task.  However, between-
aggregate switch speed did not vary as a function of aggregate task complexity.  In fact 
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RTs were similar for the more and less complex task across transition type.  For both 
complexities repetition trials were performed more quickly than either switch type.  A 
3(transition: repetition, within-aggregate switch, between-aggregate switch) x 
2(aggregate task complexity: more complex, less complex) repeated-measures ANOVA 
found a main effect of transition, F(2,24)=31.55, p<.001, ηp
2
=.72.  Neither the main 
effect of aggregate task complexity, F(1,12)=0.23, p=.64, nor the interaction reached 
significance, F(2,24)=.07, p=.93.  Planned contrasts found no difference between the 
response speed of between-aggregate switches in the more complex condition and 
between-aggregate switches in the less complex conditions, F(1, 12)=0.004, p=.95.   
 Task choice. 
 Figure 9 displays proportion of transitions as a function of aggregate task 
complexity and transition type.  If aggregate tasks are switched to as a whole then it is 
likely that participants would make a greater number of within-aggregate switches in the 
more complex condition than in the less complex condition.  However, this effect was not 
found.  While the proportion of total switches that were within-aggregate switches 
performed was greater than expected (0.2) in both the more complex condition (M=0.29), 
t(12)=6.92, p<.001, and less complex condition (M=0.32), t(12)=3.65, p<.01, the extent 
that the proportion of within-aggregate switches exceeded the proportion of switches 
expected by chance did not vary based on aggregate task complexity.  A paired sample t-
test comparing the proportion of total switches that were within-aggregate switches in 
each condition confirmed the lack of effect, t(12)=0.82, p=.43.  As in the previous 
experiments the proportion of repetitions performed exceeded the expected value in both 
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the less complex condition, (M=0.32), t(12)=3.04, p<.01,and the more complex 
condition, (M=0.39), t(12)=3.07, p<.001.   
 Additional analyses. 
 As in the previous experiments, accuracy was high (M=96.6%) and did not vary 
as a function of task complexity, F(1,12)=0.75, p=0.40.  Analyses of categorization task 
and task order can be found in the Appendix. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 assessed the hypothesis that when maintaining a hierarchical task 
structure, aggregate task switches require activating all elements within a given aggregate 
task.  The current study did not find evidence of this mechanism of task activation.  
Between-aggregate switches for more and less complex aggregate tasks were switched to 
at similar speeds.  Further, the proportion of within-aggregate switches did not vary as a 
function of aggregate task complexity.  These null effects are consistent with the idea that 
aggregate tasks are not activated as a whole.  Nevertheless, such an interpretation may 
not be warranted by the current data.  Experiment 3 compared performance of a two-
element aggregate task to that of a three-element aggregate task.  This minimal difference 
in task elements was chosen due to the challenges associated with requiring participants 
to learn and maintain more than five task elements within one experimental session.  
Nevertheless, the aggregate task sizes employed may not have been different enough 
from each other to effectively test the current hypothesis.  Indeed general differences in 
mean RT between the more and less complex aggregate tasks were not found, suggesting 
that this manipulation may not have been effective.   Further experimentation, using 
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aggregate tasks whose complexities differ from each other to a greater extent than those 
used in the current study would be desirable.     
Nevertheless, a null result may have been found even if larger differences in the 
task complexity had been created simply because aggregate tasks may operate differently 
within a free choice environment than in situations where task order is constrained.  .  
Consider how the manipulation of aggregate task complexity used in Experiment 3 
differed from that used in previous studies of aggregate tasks.  Studies of task ensembles 
have defined task complexity as the number of switches required within that sequence 
and have tended to hold the number of tasks required within that sequence constant (Lien 
& Ruthruff, 2004; Schneider, 2007; Schneider & Logan, 2006).  Such a measure of task 
complexity cannot be manipulated when task order is unconstrained; however, the 
measure is highly relevant when tasks must be performed in a specified order.  Task 
switches are difficult due to the persisting activation of the task performed on the 
previous trial (Allport et al., 1994).  Preparing for the sequence of task switches to be 
performed within the task ensemble prior to beginning the first task element would be 
advantageous, as it would allow for advanced preparation of these difficult task 
transitions.  However, when task order is unspecified, the reason for shifting to all of the 
task elements that belong to a task ensemble at once is less clear.  Doing so may actually 
impair performance.  Indeed, keeping a greater number of tasks active than necessary is 
likely to reduce the speed with which the current task could be performed (Basak & 
Verhaeghen, 2011).  Thus mechanisms other than the activating of all of the task 
elements that belong to an aggregate task at once, may better explain the influence of 
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hierarchical representations on action selection and performance found in the current set 
of studies.      
General Discussion 
 The current study explored the effect of hierarchical representations of tasks on 
action selection.  The circumstances in which hierarchical representations would be 
induced and maintained were assessed using the voluntary task switching paradigm.  
Across three experiments, evidence of hierarchical representations was found under some 
but not all circumstances.  Following manipulations that occurred during the multitasking 
portion of the study, when participants had successfully learned the S-R mappings 
associated with each task element, participants were faster to perform within-aggregate 
task switches than to perform between-aggregate task switches.  Participants were also 
more likely to switch between task elements that were part of the same aggregate task 
than to switch between task elements that were part of different aggregate tasks, under 
these conditions.  It seems that hierarchical task representations that guide task choice can 
be established within free choice multitasking environments.  Below I consider how the 
current results can inform on when and how hierarchical representations are formed, how 
these representations become activated and the function these representations may serve.   
The Formation of Hierarchical Representations 
 Previous research has demonstrated that hierarchical representations are formed 
when participants are performing multiple tasks in a prespecified order (Schneider & 
Logan, 2006; 2007).  The current study extended this research by demonstrating that 
hierarchical representations can also be formed within a free choice multitasking 
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environment in which task selection does not follow a strict serial order.  Experiment 1 
used three conditions of increasing complexity to attempt to induce a hierarchical 
representation with the voluntary task switching paradigm.  No evidence of hierarchical 
representations was found in the introduction condition, which included explicit 
instruction concerning which task elements belonged to which aggregate tasks, and 
spatial and temporal manipulations designed to introduce task elements in a hierarchical 
manner.  In the after effect condition, which used an aggregate task-level after effect to 
reinforce the aggregate task structure set up during practice, task choice data but not RT 
data was suggestive of the establishment of a hierarchical task representation.  Only in 
the forced choice condition, in which participants were required to maintain the aggregate 
task structure throughout the experiment, was evidence of a hierarchical task 
representation, in both task choice and performance measures, found.  The results of 
Experiment 2 suggest that it was the ability to establish a hierarchical representation, 
rather than the requirement to maintain such a representation, that resulted in the 
hierarchical task structure found in the forced choice condition of Experiment 1.  Once a 
hierarchical representation was established, via the forced choice manipulation in 
Experiment 2, that representation was maintained throughout the study, even when the 
requirement to retain aggregate task structure was removed.   
 That a strong hierarchical representation, able to influence both RT and choice 
measures, was established in only one of the three hierarchical conditions employed in 
Experiment 1 was unexpected given the general tendency that participants in previous 
research have shown toward establishing hierarchical representations.  For example, task 
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ensembles have previously been found to occur simply as a result of the requirement to 
perform tasks in a prespecified order, a manipulation that was so subtle that 
experimenters using this type of paradigm have often been unaware that a hierarchical 
representation may be induced (Altmann, 2007).  More direct attempts to establish 
hierarchical representations, through explicit experimenter suggestion (Schneider, 2007) 
and spatial and temporal stimulus manipulation (Lien & Ruthruff, 2004) have also proved 
highly effective.  Yet, within Experiment 1 a combination of all three of these 
manipulations (explicit suggestion, spatial stimulus manipulation, and temporal stimulus 
manipulation) during the practice phase of the study was ineffective at producing a 
hierarchical representation.   
 The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the introduction condition of Experiment 
1 failed to effectively establish a hierarchical representation during the practice phase of 
the study.  Indeed, previous studies that have employed these manipulations have done so 
throughout the entire experimental session, such that measurements of RT suggestive of 
an aggregate task structure always occurred while the manipulations that induced that 
structure were taking place (e.g. Lien & Ruthruff, 2004).  Experiment 2 demonstrated 
that hierarchical representations persist after these manipulations have ceased, so long as 
the hierarchical representation has been sufficiently established.  Nevertheless, the 
establishing of that structure may only take place once the task elements that make up an 
aggregate task have been successfully learned, except in cases where establishing a 
hierarchical representation would preclude the requirement to establish more basic 
behaviors (Barde, Kayser, & D'Esposito, 2010).  This finding is consistent with literature 
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on skill acquisition, which proposes that complex behaviors made of multiple actions will 
not be acquired until the basic behaviors that will make up these complex actions have 
been successfully learned (Rosenbaum et al., 2007).   
 Vallacher and Wegner’s (1987) theory of action identification provides a further 
potential explanation for why manipulations employed during the practice phase were 
ineffective at creating a hierarchical representation.  According to their theory every 
action can be identified at multiple, hierarchical levels but the specific level at which an 
action will be identified at any given time will vary according to specific principles.  
Generally, when both higher-level and lower-level identities are available, there is a 
tendency for the higher-level to become prepotent.  However, higher-level identifications 
will not always be able to sustain behavior.  Lower-level identities will allow one to focus 
on the more basic features required by a task.  As a result lower-level identities will tend 
to become prepotent when an action cannot be maintained in terms of a higher-level 
identity.  For example when one is first learning to ride a bike she will tend to identify the 
action at a low level, such as peddling or steering the bike.  The low level representation 
reflects the focus of her action on specific motor movements.  Once one becomes skilled 
at bike riding she is likely to identify the action at a higher level, such as getting exercise 
or exploring the neighborhood.  However, if the path she is traveling was to suddenly 
become difficult, for example if she encountered a number of potholes, identification 
would return to a lower-level (e.g. steering around potholes).  This theory of action 
identification suggests that skill level and familiarity with an action will influence how 
that action is identified, with less skilled actions being identified at lower-levels.   
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 Vallacher and Wegner’s (1987) theory of action identification could explain why 
the manipulations within the introduction condition were ineffective at inducing a 
hierarchical representation.  These manipulations all occurred during the practice portion 
of the experiment.  During this time participants were struggling to learn arbitrary S-R 
mappings for four new tasks.  The need to perform this difficult learning behavior is 
likely to have caused participants to identify their action at a low level (i.e. at the level of 
the individual categorization tasks).  As a result manipulations that required focus on the 
higher-level aggregate task structure were likely to have gone unattended.  Only after 
these basic categorization tasks had been learned sufficiently would participants have 
been able to shift to a higher-level identification and form a hierarchical representation of 
their actions.  These same introduction manipulations may have been effective if the 
responses required by each task had been less difficult to learn.  For example if subjects 
had made transparent verbal responses to each classification (e.g. saying “short” in 
response to the size quality measure) the ease with which their responses had been 
performed may have allowed them to represent their actions at a higher level such that 
the hierarchical manipulations would have been attended to.  An empirical test of this 
hypothesis would be helpful in determining the specific situations required for the 
formation of hierarchical representations within a free choice multitasking environment.
 Even after the task elements that make up an aggregate task have been learned, 
the influence of hierarchical representations appears to occur in a somewhat gradual 
manner.  Within Experiment 1 evidence of a hierarchical representation was found in the 
forced choice condition within both measures of RT and measures of task choice.  
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However, within the after effect condition the effect was only found within task choice 
measures suggesting that the hierarchical representation had been less firmly established 
within this condition.  It seems that choice measures were more sensitive to hierarchical 
task formation.  The specific mechanisms that lead to an influence of hierarchical 
representations on choice prior to their influence on performance are considered in the 
next section. 
 The graded influence of hierarchical representations found in the current study is 
consistent with the finding of Lein and Ruthruff (2004).  They manipulated the extent 
that task elements could be viewed as aggregate tasks over the course of five 
experiments.  Each manipulation led to larger and larger restart costs.  It appears that 
hierarchical representations can result in influences that exist at different strengths 
depending on the extent to which one’s experience with a set of task elements suggests an 
aggregate task structure. 
 If variations in the strength of hierarchical representations exist and the strength 
of a single hierarchical representation’s influence can increase with increased use, it is 
also likely that the influence of hierarchical representations may sometimes become 
weaker with reduced use.  If the aggregate task structure is not supported, the influence of 
the hierarchical representation would be expected to weaken, and effects on performance 
and action selection would fade.  For example, the influence of the hierarchical structure 
would be expected to weaken if the task elements that belonged to the aggregate task 
were performed more often within an environment suggestive of an individual 
representation rather than a hierarchical representation, or if the task elements were to 
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become part of a different aggregate task.  The results of Experiment 2 suggest that 
fading does not occur immediately.  No evidence of a reduced influence of hierarchical 
representations was found during the eight blocks of the second half of that experiment.  
However, such effects may be expected if the task elements had been performed in a 
context not previously associated with hierarchical representations or perhaps even in the 
same context after extended periods of responding.  Further research assessing the 
situations that strengthen and weaken the influence of hierarchical representations is 
likely to provide insight into behavioral flexibility.   
The Activation of Hierarchical Representations  
 Once it was determined that hierarchical representations could be established 
within a free choice multitasking environment, the next question of interest was by what 
mechanisms do hierarchical representations exert an influence.  One possibility was that 
all elements of an aggregate task are switched to at once (Schneider, 2007).  If switching 
to an aggregate task results in activation of all of the task elements within that aggregate 
task then this within-aggregate activation would make within-aggregate switches both 
faster and more likely.  Experiment 3 attempted to assess this hypothesis as an 
explanation of the influences of task choice and performance found in Experiments 1 and 
2.  However, the results of Experiment 3 did not provide support for the proposal that 
aggregate task elements are activated in unison.  The time required to switch to a more 
complicated aggregate task containing three task elements did not differ from the time 
required to switch to a less complicated aggregate task containing two task elements.  
Additionally, the proportion of within-aggregate task switches did not vary as a function 
 89 
 
of task complexity.  Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this lack of support was due to a 
failure of the hypothesis to explain the influence of hierarchical representations on task 
choice and performance or a failure to effectively manipulate differences in task 
complexity within Experiment 3.   
 While the results of Experiment 3 may not be sufficient to rule out the possibility 
that aggregate tasks are activated in unison, the lack of an effect of aggregate task 
complexity does suggest that other explanations of the effect of hierarchical 
representations on choice and performance during a free choice multitasking environment 
may be required.  Two potential mechanisms are considered below.   
 Spreading activation. 
  One possibility is that hierarchical representations affect action selection due to 
spreading activation.  Spreading activation between lexical representations and between 
conceptual representations has been proposed to account for priming effects within these 
domains (Estes & Jones, 2009; Inoue, 1991).  Spreading activation has also been 
proposed to function between similar task sets (Arrington et al., 2003).  When a single 
representation is activated, the activation will flow to those representations to which it is 
most closely related.  As a result those related representations will be activated more 
quickly.  In fact facilitation specific to related items is found even in situations where 
participants are expecting to have to produce an unrelated item (Neely, 1977).  Spreading 
activation could work in a similar manner within a hierarchical task structure.  Task 
elements that are part of the same aggregate task may be bound together more strongly 
than individually represented task elements or task elements that are part of two different 
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representations.  Even if an individual task element were activated independently, 
because the task element is part of an aggregate task, the activation could quickly travel 
to and activate the other elements within the aggregate task.  Thus, performance of task 
elements that are part of the same aggregate task could be facilitated via spreading 
activation in a way that makes within-aggregate switches both faster and more likely.   
 However, the findings of Experiment 3 may speak against spreading activation as 
the mechanism by which hierarchical representations exert their influence.  Fan models 
suggest that when activation spreads passively from one representation to another, the 
strength of this spreading activation will be divided between all of the representations to 
which the initially activated representation is bound (Radvansky, 1999).  As a result, the 
strength of spreading activation will be inversely proportional to the number of 
representations to which the initial representation is connected.  If it is assumed that 
spreading activation occurs similarly between task elements, then the strength with which 
any one task element within an aggregate task is activated should depend on the number 
of task elements within that aggregate task.  In Experiment 3, in which the number of task 
elements in each aggregate task varied, within-aggregate activation should have been 
stronger for the less complex aggregate task, and within-aggregate switches should have 
been facilitated.  However, as described above, neither task choice nor task performance 
varied as a function of aggregate task complexity in Experiment 3.  Thus the current 
study fails to support spreading activation as a mechanism by which hierarchical 
representations exert an influence.  Nevertheless, the same limitations of Experiment 3 
that prevent the outright rejection of the hypothesis that all of the task elements within an 
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aggregate task are activated at once, also prevents the rejection of spreading activation as 
a mechanism by which hierarchical representations exert an influence.  A more direct test 
of the impact of spreading activation on hierarchical representations is warranted.   
 Prioritization strategy. 
 An alternative to the spreading activation account is that the effect of hierarchical 
representations on task choice and performance may result from a prioritization strategy 
in which task elements that are part of the same aggregate task as the task element 
performed on the previous trial, receive priority for selection.  Shomstein and Yantis 
(2002; 2004) have proposed a prioritization strategy to account for object-based effects of 
attention during visual search tasks.  If the location where the target will be presented is 
known with 100% certainty, such as when the location is validly cued, this information 
can be used to successfully guide visual search and configural or object-based 
information will not be needed.  However, in situations of uncertainty, when multiple 
shifts of attention may be required in order to locate a target, configural information will 
prioritize attentional shifts.  Specifically, when one is attending to a location within an 
object, other locations within that object will be prioritized, such that attention will be 
shifted toward within-object locations prior to shifting to locations that fall outside of the 
object or that fall within another object.   
 A similar prioritization strategy may be adopted during task element selection.  
As in visual search, if the to-be-selected task element is known with absolute certainty, 
such as when the upcoming task is cued, then the configuration of task representations 
would not be relevant to task selection.  However, when the specific task element 
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required for performance on an upcoming trial is unknown, as is the case during 
voluntary task switching, then internal shifts of attention may be prioritized toward task 
elements that are part of the same aggregate task as the task element performed on the 
previous trial.  A prioritization mechanism would be able to account for the influence of 
hierarchical representations on task choice and performance found in the current study.  
Further, the account would not make differential assumptions regarding the proportion of 
within-aggregate switches or speed of within-aggregate switches that would be made for 
tasks of varying complexity.  A shift of attention is an all-or-none process that would be 
expected to be made toward one of the task elements that belong to the aggregate task 
performed on the previous trial, regardless of the number of total task elements that 
aggregate task contained.  Thus a prioritization strategy could account for both for the 
findings in the current set of experiments, that participants tend to make a greater number 
of within-aggregate task switches than between-aggregate task switches and the finding 
in Experiment 3 that the proportion of within-aggregate switches performed does not vary 
as a function of aggregate task complexity.    
 A prioritization strategy could also prove to be strategic in everyday action 
selection situations.  Within the current study the similarity of the task elements that 
made up each aggregate task was controlled for.  However, within more naturalistic 
circumstances task elements that are part of the same hierarchical representation are 
likely to be more similar to one another than task elements belonging to different 
hierarchies.  Similar tasks are likely to share task set parameters (Arrington et al., 2003).  
As a result switching between task elements that are part of the same aggregate task may 
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require that only a subset of the parameters within the task set be changed.  This shorter 
reconfiguration process would be expected to lead to quicker task performance (Logan & 
Gordan, 2001).   
 Empirical tests are clearly required in order to ascertain the specific mechanism 
by which hierarchical representations exert their influence on task selection and 
performance.  However, if the influence of hierarchical representations is to be fully 
elucidated, it is also necessary to attempt to model where within the task performance 
process hierarchical representations exert an influence.  Performing a task is a two stage 
process (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Rubinstein et al., 2001).  First, 
during the goal setting stage the to-be-performed task will need to be selected.  Then 
during the performance readiness stage the task set, or parameters that will allow for the 
performance of the selected task, will need to be implemented.  Within voluntary task 
switching, task choice allows for a distinct measure of the task selection processes that 
occur during the goal setting stage (Arrington & Logan 2004).  However, the presence of 
this stage was identified prior to the development of the voluntary task switching 
paradigm, based on the independent contribution that goal setting processes make toward 
the time required to perform a task (Rubinstien et al, 2001).  Whereas task choice will be 
dictated by the processes that occur during the task selection phase of task switching, RT 
will be determined both by the processes occurring during task selection and by processes 
occurring during task set implementation.   
 Schneider (2007) proposed that hierarchical representations are likely to influence 
the initial goal setting stage of task switching.  Specifically, hierarchical representations 
 94 
 
were proposed to speed up the task selection process.  If hierarchical representations do 
indeed exert their influence on task selection then within the voluntary task switching 
paradigm hierarchical representations would be expected to influence both task choice 
and performance.  The current findings support this hypothesis.  Across three 
experiments hierarchical representations were found to influence both the probability that 
one would switch to a specific task element and the speed with which that switch was 
made.  Interestingly, hierarchical representations appeared to exert an influence on task 
choice prior to exerting an influence on RT.  This suggests that hierarchical 
representations were influencing the outcome of the goal setting stage prior to the time 
when they influenced the speed with which that stage could be completed.  If hierarchical 
representations exert an influence on the goal setting stage by biasing task selection 
toward specific task elements, then this would be expected to have an immediate 
influence on task choice.  This bias would also have the potential to speed the goal setting 
process by reducing the uncertainty associated with task selection.  However, it may take 
time to learn to utilize this bias in a manner that is automatic enough to benefit task 
performance.  Thus influences on RT may lag behind the influence on choice. 
 Hierarchical representations appear to influence the goal setting stage of task 
performance.  Of the two stages of task switching, goal setting is the less understood 
(Vanderiendonck et al., 2010).  A descriptive explanation of task selection has been 
provided by Arrington and Logan (2005) and a somewhat more specific model has been 
proposed by Vandierendonck and colleagues (Demanet, 2010).  While these proposals 
vary in their specific details, both share a general theme.  That is, both propose that 
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within free choice multitasking environments, task selection will reflect a combination of 
top-down processes that guide performance according to a participant’s intention and 
bottom-up processes that exert systematic biases on task choice.  Hierarchical 
representations have the possibility of influencing either of these processes.  For example, 
Arrington and Logan (2005) have proposed that task selection is the result of a 
competition between an availability heuristic and a representativeness heuristic.  
According to this proposal, participants will maintain a short series of the most recently 
performed tasks within WM and attempt to select tasks that will make this series best 
comply with the instructions to perform tasks randomly.  However, this choice will be 
subject to bias based on which task is currently most available.  Hierarchical 
representations could bias task selection by exerting an influence on the availability 
heuristic.  Specifically, when a task element is performed this could cause the other task 
elements that belong to that aggregate task to become more available (e.g. due to 
spreading activation or to a prioritization strategy).  As a result, task elements that are 
part of the aggregate task performed on the previous trial may be more likely to be 
selected by the availability heuristic and thus more likely to be performed.   
 Alternatively, hierarchical representations could exert their influence by changing 
the way that sequences of tasks are selected.  Both the heuristic competition explanation 
of task selection and the chain-retrieval model of task selection assume that participants 
use top-down control to select tasks in a manner that allows them to create a sequence of 
tasks that will comply with voluntary task instructions (Arrington & Logan, 2005; 
Demanet, 2010).  They may do this either by maintaining a sequence of the most recently 
 96 
 
performed tasks in memory and then selecting the next task based on their perception of 
what will keep this task sequence random or by retrieving small chains of tasks that 
comply with the randomness instructions and then selecting tasks in the order indicated 
by the retrieved chains.  Generating sequences of tasks when switching between only two 
tasks is likely to be less taxing than generating sequences when selecting between four or 
five tasks.  Hierarchical representations may be a way of organizing tasks that becomes 
strategic for the generation of sequences when a large number of potential tasks are 
available.  For example, Vandeirendonck and colleagues (Demanet, 2010) have proposed 
that some of the repetition bias found in voluntary task switching may be part of a 
strategic plan implemented by the participant.  Participants are sensitive to the ease of 
task repetitions relative to task switches (Botvinick & Rosen, 2009) and as a result 
sequences of tasks that have a greater number of task repetitions than task switches will 
be more likely to be selected for performance.  Thus, task selection occurs in a strategic 
manner that takes advantage of the ease of repeating tasks.  A bias toward performing 
task elements that are part of the aggregate task performed on the previous trial could be 
another strategic bias that may be particularly useful when switching between more than 
two tasks.  For example when deciding which task to select next a mechanism (such as a 
prioritization strategy) that directs attention to one specific task element when multiple 
task elements are available for performance could speed the task selection process.  
Nevertheless, this benefit for within-aggregate switches is likely to become a cost when 
one is required to make a between-aggregate switch.  This would account for the findings 
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of greater between-aggregate than within-aggregate switch costs found in the current 
study. 
 Hierarchical representations may influence action selection either through a 
bottom-up bias or a top-down strategy.  The nascent literature on task selection and 
voluntary task switching makes differentiating between these alternatives difficult.  
Nevertheless, if hierarchical representations exert their influence as part of a top-down 
strategy that directs and speeds task selection, then this could explain their function.    
The Function of Hierarchical Representation 
 If hierarchical representations are adopted within free choice multitasking 
environments, then there is likely to be a functional explanation for their generation.  In 
the introduction I laid out three possible functions that hierarchical representations may 
serve.  First, hierarchical representations may be adopted because they aid in the 
performance of the task elements that make up that representation.  Both Koch et al. 
(2006) and Schneider (2007) found performance benefits for task elements performed as 
part of an aggregate task.  However, performance benefits are not universal (Dreisbach et 
al., 2007), and therefore seemed unlikely to be the primary function of hierarchical 
representations.  Nevertheless, if hierarchical representations tend to lead task element 
performance benefits in most situations, then people may be inclined to consistently 
adopt hierarchical representations, regardless of whether or not these benefits are 
applicable within the present situation.  The current study does not support this 
explanation.  Hierarchical representations did not lead to improvements in task element 
performance in any of the current experiments.  Further in the forced choice condition of 
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Experiment 1, in which a hierarchical representation was clearly present, mean RT was 
slowed compared to the other conditions.  Thus it does not seem likely that hierarchical 
task representations typically lead to enhanced task element performance during 
voluntary task switching.  These results are in line with those of Dreisbach (Dreisbach et 
al., 2007) who has argued that as performance is not improved for actions represented at 
the task level compared to those represented as SR mappings, speeding action 
performance cannot be the function of hierarchical representations (Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008).  Thus potential task element benefits are not likely to drive the formation of 
hierarchical representations.   
 A second proposed function of hierarchical representations was that these 
representations may allow task order to be more easily maintained within situations in 
which one is required to complete tasks in a specific serial order.  The benefits to 
memory associated with creating higher order groupings are well known (Gobet et al., 
2001).  However, if this was the primary function of hierarchical representations then one 
would not expect them to ever be adopted within any of the experiments or conditions in 
the current study in which task order was unconstrained.  The presence of hierarchical 
representations in the current study suggests that this is not the primary purpose of 
hierarchical representations.  This is not to say that memory does not play a role in the 
formation of hierarchical representations.  Indeed the ability to remember which task 
elements belong to a specific aggregate task would be a necessary condition for forming a 
representation of that task, and this memory requirement within the forced choice 
condition appears to have led to the formation of hierarchical representations.  Further, it 
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is likely that hierarchical representations do aid in the maintenance of task order in 
situations where such order is required.  Indeed, this additional benefit may explain why 
hierarchical representations seem to be more readily adopted within situations where 
serial memory of task elements is required.  However, the current findings of hierarchical 
representations within a situation in which maintenance of task order is required, suggest 
that hierarchical representations serve a function beyond simply aiding in the 
maintenance of serially ordered tasks. Finally, hierarchical representations may 
serve to aid in the organization and selection of actions.  If a primary function of 
hierarchical representations is to aid action selection, then hierarchical representations 
would be expected to influence task choice.  This result was found in the current study.  
Across three experiments subjects choosing tasks within the free choice environment 
showed influences of hierarchical representation on task choice.  Situations were found in 
which subjects were more likely to switch between task elements that were part of the 
same aggregate task than to switch between task elements that were part of different 
aggregate tasks.  Not only were hierarchical representations found to affect task choice, 
but task choice measures seemed to be even more sensitive to the formation of 
hierarchical representations than were measures of task performance.  This sensitivity 
may reflect the functional role that hierarchical representations typically play in action 
selection.   
 The number of stimuli affording action at any given time will always exceed the 
number of actions that one can perform simultaneously.  It is therefore necessary for one 
to select which actions to perform at any given moment.  Given the ability of stimuli to 
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automatically activate tasks that they afford (Logan, 1988; Norman & Shallice, 1986), 
ensuring that only actions consistent with one’s current goals are actually performed may 
be strenuous and require executive control (Arrington & Yates, 2009; Weaver & 
Arrington, invited revision).  Hierarchical representations may aid in this process by 
constraining the tasks that stimuli activate (Mayr & Keele, 2000), and focusing attention 
on only those actions that are part of one’s current goal.  This view of action selection 
assigns hierarchical representation a goal-shielding function similar to that proposed to 
drive the formation of task sets (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; 2009).  In both cases the 
hierarchical representations focus attention and shield the task goal from the influence of 
irrelevant information.  Just as task sets can prevent irrelevant stimulus information from 
influencing task performance, hierarchical representations may prevent irrelevant tasks 
from influencing action selection.  Indeed the current study demonstrated the potential for 
hierarchical representations at the aggregate task level to serve this function.  Once a task 
element belonging to a specific aggregate task had been performed, participants showed a 
tendency to continue to select task elements that were part of the same aggregate task 
rather than to switch to new task elements.  Hierarchical representations biased task 
choice, presumably by exerting an influence on the goal setting stage of task switching.  
So while all possible task elements were equally available within the stimulus 
environment on each trial, the representations of task elements that belong to the 
aggregate task performed on the previous trial may have been more available for task 
performance.  As a result participants choose to persist in the performance of task 
elements that belonged to the same aggregate task.  This type of within-aggregate task 
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persistence occurred as a bias within the current study in which subjects were instructed 
to switch between all tasks randomly.  However, this bias would be functional within a 
typical multitasking situation, in which hierarchical representations can be conceptualized 
as multicomponent goals.  When performing tasks outside of the laboratory, within-
aggregate task persistence would typically help to ensure that all of the steps required to 
complete a goal are performed before goal-irrelevant behaviors are selected for 
performance.  For example, when engaged in the goal of making spaghetti, a within-
aggregate bias would ensure that after performing one task element, such as boiling 
noodles, that other task elements that were part of the same task, such as making sauce, 
would be prioritized for selection over other tasks that would be equally afforded by the 
stimulus environment, such as washing dishes.  Thus, hierarchical task representations 
would help to ensure that every task within a multi-task goal is accomplished. 
 People engage in action selection and performance many times on a daily basis.  
The activity is intuitively volitional, yet research has shown that the process is subject to 
a great deal of external influence (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  Bottom-up processes can 
guide attention and influence action.  Cognitive control can be used to overcome these 
biases; however these cognitive resources are limited and can be depleted (Braver et al., 
2008).  Mechanisms that can reduce potential biases without utilizing valuable cognitive 
resources would therefore be desirable.  Hierarchical representations may be one such 
mechanism.  Once a higher order goal has been selected, hierarchical task representations 
can help shield that goal from irrelevant, distracting information, and constrain task 
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choice to those task elements that fall within the desired aggregate goal, thus helping to 
ensure goal completion.  
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Table 1.  Manipulations that were used in each of the conditions in Experiment 1. 
    Explicit Spatial  Temporal    After  Forced 
    Instruction Introduction Introduction   Effects       Choice Trials 
Control:         -                     -          -        -       -  
Hierarchical: 
     Introduction        X        X         X        -       - 
     After Effect         X        X         X        X       -  
     Forced Choice      X        X         X        X       X  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Depiction of the parameters on which stimuli could vary in Experiment 1.  
These stimuli are only four of the 16 stimuli used in this experiment.  
Figure 2.  Mean RTs for Experiment 1 as a function of condition and transition type.  
Error bars in this and all figures are 95% confidence intervals calculated from the error 
term for the within-subject variable as suggested by Masson and Loftus (2003).  Standard 
error values are presented within the base of each of this and all graphs.   
Figure 3.  Mean proportion of transitions for Experiment 1 as a function of condition and 
transition type.   
Figure 4.  Mean RT (A) and proportion of transitions (B) as a function of transition type 
and the number of trials since the last forced choice trial was performed within the forced 
choice condition of Experiment 1. 
Figure 5.  Mean RT (A) and proportion of transitions (B) as a function of switch type and 
block within Experiment 2.  The lines following block eight represent the point within the 
experiment in which the procedure was changed such that it no longer included forced 
choice trials. 
Figure 6.  Mean RTs for Experiment 2 as a function of half and transition type. 
Figure 7.  Mean proportion of transitions for Experiment 2 as a function of half and 
transition type. 
Figure 8.  Mean RTs for Experiment 3 as a function of aggregate task complexity and 
transition type.   
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Figure 9.  Mean proportion of transitions for Experiment 3 as a function of aggregate task 
complexity and transition type. 
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Figure 1 
          Example 
         Stimuli: 
 
Size Task:       long     or  short   
Shape Task:                rectangular or round 
Fill Task:                                            solid or outlined 
Orientation Task:                                            vertical or horizontal 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5  
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Figure 6
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Figure 7 
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Appendix 
Experiment 1 
   Task type was also assessed in order to determine whether the specific 
categorization tasks performed affected performance or choice measures (see Table A1).  
Across conditions, the shape task was performed slightly more slowly than the size task 
and was performed slightly less often than the fill task.  Importantly, the effect of task 
type did not vary as a function of condition.  A 4(condition: control, introduction, after 
effect, forced choice) x 4 (task type: fill, orientation, shape, size) ANOVA with condition 
as a between-subjects factor and task type as a within-subject factor was conducted on 
RT data.  A marginally significant main effect of task type was found, F(3,159)=2.51, 
p=.06, ηp
2
=.05.  Post hoc test revealed a marginally significant difference between the 
fastest of the tasks, the size task, and the slowest of the tasks, the shape task, p=.09.  
Neither the main effect of condition, F(3,53)=2.01, p=0.12, nor the interaction, 
F(3,159)=0.89, p=.54, reached significance.  A marginal effect of task type was also 
found when the same analysis was conducted on the task choice performed, 
F(3,51)=2.28, p=.09, ηp
2
=.12.  In this case post hoc tests indicated that the fill task was 
performed on a greater proportion of trials than the shape task.  Once again, neither the 
main effect of condition, F(3,53)=0.00, p=1.00, nor the interaction, F(9,159)=1.00, 
p=.44, reached significance.   
A final set of analyses were conducted in order to ascertain whether task order 
influenced performance or choice measures or varied by condition (see Table A2).  As 
indicated above, task order determined which tasks were paired together, with the first 
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two presented task elements becoming part of the first aggregate task and the second two 
tasks elements becoming part of the second aggregate task.  Task order did not affect 
performance or choice measures, nor did it interact significantly with condition.  A 
4(condition: control, introduction, after effect, forced choice) x 4 (task order: first, 
second, third, fourth) ANOVA with condition as a between subjects factor conducted on 
RT data found no significant effect of task order, F(3,51)=0.70, p=.56, no main effect of 
condition,  F(3,53)=2.01, p=0.12, and no interaction, F(9,159)=0.30, p=0.97.  The same 
analysis conducted on task choice also failed to find a significant effect of task order, 
F(3,159)=1.83, p=.15, condition,  F(3,53)=0.00, p=1.00, or an interaction, F(9,159)=1.02, 
p=0.55.   
Experiment 2 
The effect of categorization task on RT and choice measures was assessed as a 
function of experiment half (see Table A3).  The fill task was performed more quickly 
than the orientation or the shape task.  The size task was performed slightly more quickly 
than the orientation or shape task.  As in Experiment 1, the fill task was also performed 
on a greater proportion of trials than the shape task.  None of the task type effects varied 
as a function of experiment half.  A 2 (half: first, last) x 4 (task type: fill, orientation, 
shape, size) repeated-measures ANOVA on RT found a main effect of task type, 
F(3,39)=8.72, p=.06, ηp
2
=.05.  The interaction was not significant, F(3,39)=0.50, p=.69.  
Post hoc tests revealed a significant difference in speed between the fill task and the 
orientation task p<.05 and the fill task and the shape task, p<.05 with the fill task being 
performed more quickly than either the orientation or fill task.  In addition marginally 
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significant differences between the size task, and the orientation task, p=.06, and the size 
task and the shape task, p=.08, were found with the size task being performed more 
quickly than orientation or shape task.  A main effect of task type was also found when 
the same analysis was conducted on the task choice performed, F(3,11)=10.96, p<.01, 
ηp
2
=.75.  In this case post hoc tests indicated that the fill task was performed on a greater 
proportion of trials than the shape task.  Task type did not interact with half, 
F(3,39)=1.30, p=.29.   
 The potential influence of task order on RT and choice during each half of 
Experiment 2 was also assessed (see Table A4).  Task order did not affect performance or 
choice measures, nor did it interact significantly with half.  A 2(half: first, last) x 4 (task 
order: first, second, third, fourth) repeated-measures ANOVA on RT found no significant 
effect of task order, F(3,39)=0.51, p=.68 or interaction, F(3,39)=0.27, p=0.85.  A similar 
analysis on task choice also failed to find a significant effect of task order, F(3,11)=1.41, 
p=.29, half,  F(1,13)=0.09, p=0.78, or an interaction, F(3,39)=1.20, p=0.32.   
Experiment 3 
 Categorization task did not influence RT or task choice in Experiment 3 (see 
Table A5).  A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on RT found no significant effect of 
task type, F(4,56)=1.09, p=.37.  The same analysis conducted on task choice also 
yielded no significant effect of task type, F(4,56)=.65, p=.36.  Task order also had no 
effect on RT as revealed by a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F(4,52)=1.35, 
p=.26 (see Table A6).  The same analysis on task choice also failed to reach 
significance, F(4,52)=0.55, p=.70.  The counterbalancing of specific categorization 
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across task complexity level prevents the ability to assess the effect of task complexity 
on the speed or proportion of categorization task performed.  
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Table A1.  Mean (SE) RT and proportion of switches as a function of condition and task 
type for Experiment 1. 
    Fill         Orientation     Shape  Size   
RT      
 Control 1238 (123) 1245 (94) 1274 (116) 1171 (88) 
 Introduction 1183 (145) 1208 (144) 1228 (134) 1201 (124) 
 After Effect 973 (62) 1091 (72) 1094 (103) 1084 (113) 
 Forced Choice 1407 (114) 1475 (129) 1443 (101) 1339 (110) 
Task choice     
 Control .269 (.015) .257 (.019) .256 (.015) .218 (.012) 
 Introduction .294 (.024) .252 (.015) .232 (.015) .222 (.013) 
 After Effect .296 (.027) .230 (.014) .228 (.012) .246 (.015) 
 Forced Choice .261 (.023) .236 (.017) .240 (.015) .263 (.018)  
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Table A2.  Mean (SE) RT and proportion of switches as a function of condition and task 
order for Experiment 1. 
  First  Second Third           Fourth   
RT 
 Control 1205 (117) 1261 (116) 1240 (110) 1221 (79) 
 Introduction 1215 (129) 1212 (137) 1683 (133) 1225 (147) 
 After Effect 1032 (70) 1093 (113) 1014 (78) 1025 (95) 
 Forced Choice 1392 (123) 1432 (117) 1424 (110) 1418 (110) 
Task choice      
 Control .278 (.020) .240 (.014) .240 (.010) .242 (.016) 
 Introduction .256 (.014) .255 (.026) .242 (.015) .247 (.015) 
 After Effect .252 (.130) .258 (.014) .279 (.029) .217 (.012) 
 Forced Choice .294 (.024) .220 (.014) .237 (.015) .249 (.136)  
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Table A3.  Mean (SE) RT and proportion of switches as a function of half and task type 
for Experiment 2  
   Fill        Orientation      Shape  Size   
RT      
 First Half 1287 (127) 1457 (138) 1463 (124) 1356 (135) 
 Last Half 1023 (73) 1178 (124) 1122 (97) 1027 (66) 
Task choice     
 First Half .296 (.014) .251 (.010) .226 (.012) .227 (.017) 
 Last Half .286 (.015) .240 (.014) .235 (.008) .239 (.013)   
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Table 4A.  Mean (SE) RT and proportion of switches as a function of condition and task 
order for Experiment 2.     
     First                   Second             Third                Fourth  
RT      
 First Half  1382 (145) 1387 (133) 1407 (128) 1387 (124) 
 Last Half  1066 (79) 1057 (87) 1141 (116) 1086 (91) 
Task choice    
 First Half  0.276 (.017) 0.251 (.014) 0.250 (.010) 0.223 (.018) 
 Last Half  0.268 (.013) 0.55 (.014) 0.239 (.012) 0.239 (.015)  
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Table 5A.  Mean (SE) RT and proportion of switches as a function of task type for 
Experiment 3. 
 Fill Orientation Shape Size  Shade   
RT 1339 (108)  1346 (86)  1273 (82) 1334 (100) 1299 (109) 
Task choice  .199 (.016) .206 (.015) .193 (.015)  .177 (.014)  .226 (.016)  
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Table 6A.  Mean (SE) RT and task choice for Experiment 3 as a function of task order. 
 First  Second Third Fourth Fifth   
RT 1297 (97)   1379 (100)  1372 (91) 1423 (80) 1340 (95) 
Task choice  .204 (.018) .211 (.019) .211 (.015)  .179 (.012)  .195 (.017)  
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